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Abstract:  The purpose of this study was to discover if a relationship existed between the 
most common safety concerns and the most common UAS accidents with regards to the 
integration of the unmanned aerial system (UAS) into the National Airspace System 
(NAS).  The study used a Mixed Method approach to find the most common causes of 
UAS accidents over a five-year period, the level of safety concerns and common 
concerns from UAS pilots and sensor operators.  The quantitative data was derived from 
the Air Force, Navy and Army Safety Offices, while the qualitative data was derived 
from an online questionnaire and follow-up interviews of US Air Force UAS pilots and 
sensor operators.  Review and observation of the data consisting of data comparison, was 
conducted to discover if there were any relationship between safety concerns and safety 
accidents.  Comparison between the most common accidents during the three phases of 
flight and the level of safety concerns that each research subject had for accidents to 
occur during those phases of flight was completed. 
   UAS flight profiles were categorized into takeoff, cruise and landing and the most 
common accidents (pilot error, engine failure, loss of control and lost link), were divided 
into the respective phase of flight.  Engine failure proved to be the most common cause 
for accidents while most accidents occurred during the cruise phase of flight.  The USAF 
pilots and sensor operators’ showed a slight level of concern on a scale of 1-5 with 
regards to accidents occurring with a UAS.  Comparison showed there was a positive 
relationship between the number of accidents during takeoff and landing phases, which 
had the lowest occurrences, and a slight level of concern of accidents occurring during 
these phases.  There was a negative relationship between the number of accidents during 
cruise, the highest occurrences of accidents, and the level of concern which was slight.  
The observed number of near midair and midair collisions were low, which showed a 
positive relationship with the level of concern, observed as a slight concern.  These 
findings can be attributed to the follow-up interview in which the pilots and sensor 
operators did not believe safety was the biggest concern when integrating the UAS into 
the NAS. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
Introduction 
Integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems Into the US National Airspace System; The 
Relationship Between Safety Record and Concerns 
 
By passing the Modernization and Reform Act 2012, Congress created potential 
safety hazards with additional aircraft in an already congested national airspace.  The 
introduction of the UAS into the public aviation system is a new venture that may have 
negative effects to the NAS, as well as a negative public perception.  There are unknowns 
pertaining to effects on safety regarding midair collision avoidance, terrain avoidance and 
lost link incidents.  The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has addressed 
some of the safety concerns:  
1. The inability for UAS to detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft and  airborne 
objects in a manner similar to “see and avoid” by a pilot in a manned aircraft, 
 
2. Vulnerabilities in the command and control of UAS operations, 
 
3. Lack of technological and operational standards needed to guide the safe and 
consistent performance of UAS, and  
 
4. Lack of final regulations to accelerate the safe integration of UAS into the 
national airspace (GAO, 2012, p. 1).  
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There have been several recent studies based on UAS features and the ability for the aircraft 
to meet safety standards.  One such study conducted by Cuerno-Rejado, C., & Martínez-Val, 
R. (2011) addressed UAS civil airworthiness and the regulatory efforts from manufacturers’ 
standpoint and how they compare to the operational procedures.  Another study conducted by 
Casarosa, C., Galatolo, R., Mengali, G., & Quarta, A. (2004), before the new legislation 
passed, suggested that, “The lack of airworthiness and certification criteria for the 
employment of UAS vehicles in the civilian field has caused an uncontrolled proliferation of 
projects and the construction of a number of UAS prototypes which differ in dimension, 
weight, flight characteristics and payload carriage (Casarosa, 2004).”  Even though these 
studies address safety, there has not been research conducted on the safety concerns with 
comparison to the accident record.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the most common unmanned aerial 
system (UAS) accidents from 2009-2014 and determine a relationship between actual UAS 
accidents and safety concerns regarding their integration into the National Airspace System 
(NAS) existed.  The research survey and interview questions created by the researcher 
explored the most common safety concerns and why they were a specific concern of US Air 
Force (USAF) UAS pilots and sensor operators.  
  A convergent mixed methods research approach consisting of a collection of 
quantitative and qualitative data was utilized in this study to address the safety concerns 
associated with the integration of the unmanned aerial system into the National Airspace 
System.  The reason for collecting both quantitative and qualitative data was to validate the 
safety concerns of the integration of the UAS into the NAS from a statistical standpoint from 
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a small UAS expert group. 
 
Significance of the Study 
Anyone who has flown or will fly within the borders of the US will find this study 
significant because a “first of its kind within the borders of a country” process will be 
introduced into the aviation environment in 2015.  Today, unmanned aerial systems fly for 
military, government and research use around the world; but a new ideal will be in effect in 
September 2015 when any individual with the proper accreditation can fly a UAS within the 
US airspace.  As a result, the US public has raised many questions and concerns with the new 
regulations:  
• Are UASs safe to fly in the same airspace as aircraft carrying passengers?   
• Do they have failsafe systems?   
• Will they be able to avert midair collisions or return safely to an airport if their 
connectivity to the pilot is lost?   
The answers to these questions alone are significant enough reasons to conduct the study. 
 
Research Objective and Questions 
The research methodology was designed with the intent of producing qualitative and 
quantitative results to answer the following research objective and following questions: 
Research Objective:  Based on the most common UAS accidents causes and US Air Force 
UAS instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor operators, is there a relationship between 
safety concerns and safety issues?   
Research Questions: 
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1. What safety feature prevents UAS midair collisions?  
2. How many times has this safety feature prevented midair collisions? 
3. What safety feature prevents accidents during lost link events? 
4. How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with accidents? 
5. How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without accidents? 
6. What are the most common UAS accidents within the last five years?  
7. Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in more accidents than 
UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements? 
 
 Additionally, because there is not a significant sample size utilized for this research, 
the following inferential research questions were utilized to support the qualitative research 
method of the mixed method study: 
1. How do current (Independent Variable ‘IV’) and proposed (IV) safety features 
integrated into a UAS prevent the most common accident (Dependent Variable ‘DV’) 
occurrences?   
 
2. Does UAS pilot training (IV) reduce the number of UAS accidents (DV)?  
 
Research Approach 
 
The quantitative approach was conducted to find the most common causes of UAS 
incidents, accidents and mishaps between June 2009 and June 2014 through the use of online 
databases.  To receive expert opinions on safety, the qualitative research method consisted of 
a research survey and interview questions created for US Air Force UAS instructors and 
evaluator pilots and sensor operators.  The information gathered from the qualitative 
approach was compared to the quantitative findings to see if a relationship between the safety 
concerns and safety records existed and if the concerns were valid, as well as assessing 
answers to the posed research objective and questions. 
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Assumptions 
The researcher makes the following assumptions regarding this study: 
1. The accident reports provided by the US Air Force, Army and Navy safety offices are 
an accurate and reliable source of accident data and information. 
 
2. The answers and information provided by the USAF UAS pilots and sensor operators 
were truthful and non-biased. 
 
Limitations 
The researcher acknowledges the following limitations associated with this study: 
The challenge with conducting this research study is conducting the qualitative portion of the 
study on a large enough sample of the US military to garner significant results.  This 
challenge is due to time allotted for the study, funding and the ability to reach out to a large 
enough sample population given military regulations and restrictions.    
 
Terminology 
 
Accident: occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between 
the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and until such time as all 
such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury or in 
which the aircraft receives substantial damage. (Aviation-terms, 2015). 
 
Airworthiness: (of an aircraft) meeting established standards for safe flight; equipped and 
maintained in condition to fly. (Dictionary.com, 2015). 
 
Certificate of Authorization (COA): authorization issued by the Air Traffic Organization to a 
public operator for a specific UA activity; a Federal Aviation Administration grant of 
approval for a specific flight operation.  (FAA, 2014).   
 
Civil Aircraft: means aircraft other than public aircraft. "Class": (1) as used with respect to 
the certification, ratings, privileges, and limitations of airmen, means a classification of 
aircraft within a category having similar operating characteristics. Examples include: single 
engine; multiengine; land; water; gyroplane; helicopter; airship; and free balloon; and (2) As 
used with respect to the certification of aircraft, means a broad grouping of aircraft having 
similar characteristics of propulsion, flight, or landing. Examples include: airplane; 
rotorcraft; glider; balloon; landplane; and seaplane.  (Aviation-terms, 2015). 
 
Civil Unmanned Aircraft System: an unmanned aircraft system that meets the qualifications 
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and conditions required for operation of a civil aircraft. 
 
Collision: the act of colliding; a coming violently into contact; crash.  (Dictionary.com, 
2015). 
 
Cruise (CR): any level flight segment after arrival at initial cruise altitude until the start of 
descent to the destination. (Phase of Flight Definition, 2013, p. 5)  
 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): the division of the Department of Transportation 
that inspects and rates civilian aircraft and pilots, enforces the rules of air safety, and installs 
and maintains air-navigation and traffic-control facilities.  (Dictionary.com, 2015). 
 
 
Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act 2012: authorized 
appropriations to the FAA from Fiscal Year 2012 through Fiscal Year 2015. The legislation 
also seeks to improve aviation safety and capacity of the national airspace system, provide a 
framework for integrating new technology safely into our airspace, provide a stable funding 
system, and advance the implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen).  (FAA, 2014). 
 
Engine Failure (E): engine in an aircraft unexpectedly stops producing thrust due to a 
malfunction other than fuel exhaustion. (Wikipedia, 2014). 
 
Incident: an occurrence other than an accident associated with the operation of an aircraft, 
which affects or could affect the safety of operations.  (Aviation-terms, 2015). 
 
Landing (L): from approach until after touchdown until aircraft exits the landing runway or 
comes to a stop, whichever occurs first. (Phase of Flight Definition, 2013, p. 7) 
 
Loss of Control (CT):  a descent during any airborne phase in which the aircraft does not 
sustain controlled flight; includes any portion of the flight after intentional or unintentional 
termination of flight, such as following system/component malfunction or failure or loss of 
control in flight. (Phase of Flight Definition, 2013, p. 7) 
 
Lost Link (LL): loss of command and control link between control station and aircraft.  
 
Public Unmanned Aircraft System: an unmanned aircraft system that meets the qualifications 
and conditions required for operation of a public aircraft. 
 
National Airspace System (NAS): is the airspace, navigation facilities and airports of the 
United States along with their associated information, services, rules, regulations, policies, 
procedures, personnel and equipment. (Wikipedia, 2015).  
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Other (O): phase of flight is not discernible from the information available, or, accident cause 
did not fall into one of the four major categories of the study. 
 
Pilot Error (PE): the action or decision of the pilot that, if not caught or corrected, could 
contribute to the occurrence of an accident or incident, including inaction or indecision.  
(Human Factors & Pilot error, 2014).  
 
See and Avoid:  when weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained 
by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this 
section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and 
may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. 
 
Sense and Avoid: the capability of an unmanned aircraft to remain a safe distance from and 
to avoid collisions with other airborne aircraft.  
Takeoff (T/O): from the application of takeoff power, through rotation and to an altitude of 
35 feet above runway elevation.  For unmanned aircraft systems, includes launching from 
any system or by any method, including systems such as a catapult.  
 
Terrain: The contour of the earth or man-made obstacles such as buildings, utility poles, 
walls or vehicles. 
 
UAS Pilot (Officer): individual pilots that operate the UAS (and crews) who are physically 
located in control centers often thousands of miles from the aircraft.  These officers have 
completed the same undergraduate flight training as other pilot specialties. 
 
UAS Sensor Operator (Enlisted): as members of the crew on UAVs, UAS Sensor Operators 
employ airborne sensors and sophisticated video imagery equipment to monitor airborne, 
maritime and ground objects. 
 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS): unmanned aircraft, control station and the command and 
control link used to connect the two.  
 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human 
operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted 
remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
Review of Literature 
For years the UAS has been used in the War on Terror and the capabilities have 
not gone unnoticed.  The Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform 
Act 2012 was passed in part to help aid US law enforcement agencies and the 
Department of Homeland Security increase their capabilities in protecting US citizens 
domestically (FAA, 2012, p. 1).  By passing the legislation, the clock has started for 
federal agencies such as the FAA to solve the issues that derive from introducing an 
unmanned aircraft into the public airways (FAA, 2012).  This review of literature 
provides an overview of the research as it pertains to: (1) UAS flight operations in the 
NAS, (2) UAS safety features, (3) UAS types and airworthiness requirements, (4) FAA 
Certification of Authorization process, and (5) UAS flight training requirements.   
This research study focused on the incidents and accidents that have occurred for 
military UAS operations within the US and overseas flight environments.  The researcher 
utilized military UAS incidents and accidents due to availability of information and 
statistics showing the Department of Defense (DoD) as the largest operator and requester 
for operations within the NAS daily.  As UAS operations increase within the NAS, it is 
possible that the rules, regulations and procedures for future operations may come from 
what has been learned from UAS operations during the War on Terror.  
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FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 was enacted in February 2012 
and according to the FAA was legislated to “improve aviation safety and capacity of the 
national airspace system, provide a framework for integrating new technology safely, 
provide a stable funding system, and advance the implementation of the Next Generation 
Air Transportation System (NextGen),” (FAA, 2014).  Though the reform act covers all 
these legislative programs, the one that stood out to the public was “integrating new 
technology safely;” this new technology being the UAS.  In Title III-Safety, Subtitle B of 
the Modernization and Reform Act, the integration of the Unmanned Aircraft System is 
discussed; it is this section that has brought the most attention to the 2012 Reform Act. 
 Within Subtitle B, UAS, the legislation spells out how the UAS will be integrated 
into the NAS, special rules and safety studies.  The Act also states that there will be a 
Roadmap for the integration of the UAS into NAS “no later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment,” (Modernization Act, p. 64, 2012); this Roadmap was drafted in 2013 and is 
referenced later in this study.   
 When reviewing the Act, some of the biggest challenges faced by the FAA and 
integrating the UAS into the NAS include, “ensuring that any civil unmanned aircraft 
system includes a sense and avoid capability; establishing standards and requirements for 
the operator and pilot of a civil unmanned aircraft system; best methods necessary to 
achieve safe and routine operations of civil unmanned aircraft systems; best methods to 
ensure safe operation of civil unmanned aircraft systems and public unmanned aircraft 
system simultaneously in the NAS,” (Modernization Act, p. 64, 2012).  These are only a 
few of the challenges faced by the FAA to integrate the UAS into the NAS and they 
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revolve around the safe implementation of this new process.  An issue that has plagued 
the UAS community for many years is the “sense and avoid” capability; because there is 
no human on board the aircraft, what is the most efficient and effective way for an 
unmanned aircraft to sense and avoid another aircraft?  The Roadmap 2013 does discuss 
this challenge and is reference later within this study. 
 With regards to safety and integration of UAS into the NAS, the Reform Act 
ensures that there is an assessment of the UAS and how it will affect the safe operational 
requirements.  The Reform Act states that, “if the Secretary determines under this section 
that certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS, the Secretary shall establish 
requirements for the safe operation of such aircraft systems in the NAS,” (Modernization 
Act, p. 67, 2012).  To facilitate the Secretary’s decision, the Modernization Act states that 
there will be safety studies conducted to “support the integration of UAS into NAS,” (p. 
68, 2012).  Since 2014, one year from the Modernization and Reform Act’s 
implementation, a Google Scholar search for “safety studies of unmanned aerial vehicles” 
yielded over 7,870 results.  Though many of these results may not be directly associated 
with the UAS integration into the NAS, it does show that there is an increased desire for 
knowledge and an ambition to ensure the safe operations of UAS.  The number of studies 
done by the FAA with regards to the integration of the UAS into the NAS could not be 
determined. 
 
UAS Flight Operations in the NAS 
 The UAS has been predominantly used in the War on Terror over countries in the 
Middle East and Southwest Asia.  During these flights, the UAS has been used to conduct 
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surveillance to aid soldiers on the ground or to deliver weapons against known terrorists 
and insurgents.  In Sep 2015, the NAS becomes available to UAS integration resulting in 
a large number of companies and government agencies preparing to begin UAS flight 
operations.  Before these companies or individuals are authorized to fly a UAS, they must 
complete the process to legally fly their UAS as a public use or civil aircraft. 
 Public use aircrafts are classified as  “an aircraft that is used only for government 
purposes; an aircraft that is leased or owned by the government and operated by any 
person for purposes related to crew training, equipment development, or demonstration” 
(sUAS News, 2012).  A civil aircraft is “any aircraft except a public aircraft” (sUAS 
News, 2012).  With these definitions in mind there are many different operators prepared 
to integrate their UAS into the NAS, some of the public use operators include the 
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Interior, 
Justice, law enforcement agencies, state universities and NASA (Williams, 2011, p. 6).  
Civil use operators include Raytheon, AAI Corp, General Atomics, Boeing and additional 
research companies that are not named (Williams, 2011, p. 6). 
 Some of the flight operations conducted by these public and civil operators 
include training missions, operational missions in law enforcement capacity, research, 
sensor development testing, marketing, border patrol, firefighting, disaster relief and 
search and rescue (Williams, 2011, p. 7).  Reported in 2010, the preponderance of 
applications for operations in the NAS came from the Department of Defense with 42%, 
followed by academia with 28% and other with 27% (Willis, 2010, p. 9).  
 After the announcement of the integration of the UAS into the NAS by September 
2015, many concerns for safety arose from the public in which the FAA’s response was 
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“The Act requires safe – not full – integration of the UAS into the NAS by September 
2015; the UAS Integration Office continues to work on a number of issues which require 
resolution in order for safe integration to occur,” (Warwick, 2014).  With the safety 
concerns in mind, the UAS Integration Office identified several different issues for which 
they needed to tackle, including but not limited to certification standards for detect-and-
avoid systems, improving the collection of safety data, developing safety risk 
management documents and developing training for air traffic controllers (Warwick, 
2014). 
 The safety concerns have grown since the 2012 Act announcement with the 
increase of UAS incidents occurring with “recreational drones” flying in and around 
major populated areas.  To help curtail some of the safety concerns and issues that have 
plagued the UAS integration, the FAA proposed in February 2015 new rules that will 
regulate operations of small UAS (under 55 pounds) and micro UAS (under 4.4 pounds).  
The rules implement that an operator of a small UAS would have to be at least 17 years 
old, pass an aeronautical knowledge test and obtain an FAA UAS operator certificate 
(FAA, 2015).  Additionally, the rules state that operator must always see and avoid 
manned aircraft, discontinue flight if it poses a hazard to other aircraft, people or 
property, assess weather, airspace restrictions and population, limit altitude to 500 ft and 
speed no faster than 100 mph and must stay out of airport flight paths and restricted 
airspace (FAA, 2015).  
 Yet even with the new guideline proposal, in January 2015 a man lost control of 
his small drone that subsequently crashed into South Lawn of the White House (NBC 
News, 2015), and as recently as September 2015 a small drone crashed into the stands of 
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a US Open tennis match which caused a delay in tournament play.  Furthermore, a drone 
crashed into the University of Kentucky Commonwealth Stadium scoreboard during 
pregame festivities (Gilbert, 2015).  In the case of the US Open crash, the operator was 
arrested and charged with reckless endangerment and flying a drone outside of a legal 
area (The Verge, 2015).  These three incidents were covered by the media and only 
spurred public opinion on the necessity for the 2012 Act to continue to be implemented 
and raise many additional questions on the ability for the FAA and law enforcement to 
ensure operators are following the guidelines set forth by the FAA.  According to the 
FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) page, between 2010 
and 2014, there were a reported 104 UAS incidents and accidents reported by academia, 
law enforcement and research facilities that were operating UAS within the confines of 
their authorized operations; the actual number of incidents and accidents that have 
occurred since that same period cannot be accurately identified and nor can the number of 
legal and illegal uses of UAS within the same time period. 
 
UAS History 
 UASs come in different shapes and sizes and are used for a multitude of mission 
tasks (FAA, 2011, p. 1).  They range from the size of a small bird to having a wingspan 
of a passenger jet (FAA, 2011, p. 1).  UASs are used in law enforcement, the War on 
Terror, search and rescue, and for scientific purposes (FAA, 2011).  Once a commodity 
of the United States, today there are 54 countries around the world that operate UASs 
(RTBOT); of the 54 countries 41 possess more than one variant of UASs (RTBOT).  
While Brazil, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union operate over 
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25 variants of UASs each (RTBOT), this dwarfs in comparison to the United States, 
which operate approximately 155 variants of UASs by numerous private companies and 
government entities (FAA Fact Sheet, 2010). 
 UAS are not new equipment to aviation and have been around since as early as 
1914.  According to Sinclair UAS Training and Certification Center, “the modern era of 
UAS development began in 1914 with Elmer Sperry’s innovations in electronic 
gyroscopic navigation systems, which ultimately provided the technology that would 
allow an aircraft to maintain level and stable flight without the need for a pilot” (Sinclair, 
2012).  During World War I and World War II, UAS testing began to take shape and 
UAS were utilized for research and training, validating the operational use of radio-
controlled drones.  In the early 1960s the USAF began to realize the potential and 
importance of the UAS and “formed two new UAS programs for use in surveillance,” 
(Sinclair, 2012), that produced two UAS surveillance platforms that were utilized during 
the Vietnam conflict. 
 With the improvement in technological and communications capabilities the UAS 
has evolved from training and surveillance drones, to the offensive power during the 
US’s War on Terror in Iraq, Afghanistan and other contested areas around the world.  
The efficiency and capabilities of UAS, and its increased use in military, research and 
law enforcement, has caused many companies, research facilities and academic 
institutions to take notice of the potential uses.  According to Sinclair (2015), “the 
potential for UAS in data collection, analysis and transmission increases by leaps and 
bounds; from meteorology to agriculture, and from geology to health sciences, (the UAS) 
is a resource that becomes more valuable as we discover new ways to use it.”  This 
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discovery will for certainly mean an increase in UAS certification requests and an 
increase of UAS within the NAS.    
 
Required UAS Safety Features 
 Title 49 of the United States Code and its subtitles refer transportation and air 
safety.  “Title 49 USC §40103(b) states that ‘The Administrator shall prescribe air traffic 
regulations regarding the flight of aircraft for: 
• Navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft, 
• Protecting individuals and property on the ground, 
• Using the navigable airspace efficiently, and 
• Preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land or water vehicles, 
and between aircraft and airborne objects (sUAS News, 2012). 
 
 The FAA has the duty to ensure the safety of air travel and currently has certain 
criteria in place to ensure this safety is upheld regarding manned aerial flight.  With the 
integration of the UAS into the NAS, a new venture in safety concerns has been opened.  
The FAA is taking steps to ensure the safe integration of UASs: 
 The FAA is laying the path forward for safe integration of  civil UAS into the 
 NAS. The roadmap will describe the  research and development necessary for the 
 FAA to develop standards and policy for safe integration. An evolved transition 
 will occur, with access increasing from accommodation to integration into today’s 
 NAS, and ultimately into the future NAS as it evolves over time. (UAS Fact 
 Sheet, 2011, p. 2). 
 
 Furthermore, the FAA has recruited the help of Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA), a Federal Advisory Committee, to answer two primary questions 
pertaining to safety: “(1) How will UAS handle communication, command, and control 
and (2) How will UAS “sense and avoid” other aircraft?” (UAS Fact Sheet, 2011, pg. 2).  
Currently, the FAA is conducting research to assist in the progress of UAS integration, 
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but there are no specific safety standards written for the UAS to be approved for flight 
operations.  Most UASs have implemented some type of safety equipment or software.  
The list of safety equipment and software includes but is not limited to: (1) 
manual flight termination (parachute release), (2) return on link fail option retraces 
planned route in the event of link loss/failure, (3) in-flight terrain collision detection 
(based on terrain elevation model) gives audible warning that collision with terrain is 
immanent, (4) waypoint route checks for terrain collision and no line of sight (LOS), and 
(5) emergency landing point preset options for fully automated recovery during a link 
failure (Skycam UAV, 2012).   
 
UAS Airworthiness Requirements 
 The Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act 2012 will 
allow the integration of the 155 variants to fly in the US NAS by 2015.  This privilege 
will not be handed out to all UAS and UAS operators.  The FAA stated: 
The NAS encompasses an average of more than 100,000 aviation operations per 
day, including air carrier, air taxi, general aviation, and military aircraft. There are 
approximately 18,000 air carrier aircraft and 230,000 active general aviation 
aircraft in the U.S (FAA, 2011, p. 1).   
 
By adding an untold amount of UASs into the NAS the potential for midair 
collisions, flight into terrain and other accidents could increase dramatically.  For the 
UAS to safely operate within the NAS, it must meet the FAA airworthiness requirements. 
 The FAA UAS office is currently under works to establish guidelines for 
airworthiness requirements of a UAS to operate in a designated capacity other than two 
certificates it currently issues: 
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In no case may any UAS or OPA be operated in the National Airspace System as 
civil unless there is an appropriate and valid airworthiness certificate issued for 
that UAS or OPA. U.S. registration is a prerequisite for the issuance of a special 
airworthiness certificate to UAS and OPA. Currently, the FAA issues UAS and 
OPA two types of special airworthiness certificates: special flight permits and 
experimental certificates.  (FAA, 2011). 
 
 The process undertaken to receive an airworthiness certificate is quite simple; the 
requester fills out a Form 8130-6 and forwards it to the FAA.  If approved, the requester 
will receive a Form 8130-7, authorizing flight operations of the UAS under a special 
flight certificate or an experimental certificate.  The FAA states, “A special flight permit 
may be issued for an aircraft that may not currently meet applicable airworthiness 
requirements but is capable of safe flight for the purpose of production flight testing new 
production aircraft” (Order 8130-34B, 2011, pp. 3-5).  An experimental flight permit is 
described as UAS that is used in “research and development (R&D), crew training, and 
market surveys” (Order 8130-34B, 2011, pp. 3-4).   
To receive a special flight certificate, the UAS must be ready and available for 
inspections deemed necessary by the FAA in accordance with FAA Order 8130.34B and 
required appendixes.  The UAS must meet such requirements as containment, lost link 
and flight termination procedures outlined in 8130.34B, and a safety evaluation 
conducted by an FAA Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI).  To meet the requirements for an 
experimental certificate, the UAS must be deemed in compliance with the FARs and 
provisions applicable to the use of the UAS in an experimental capacity.  The ASI will 
determine if the UAS and the operator meet the applicable criteria and will conduct an 
inspection and evaluation to ensure the UAS meets airworthiness criteria.    
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Once the ASI deems the UAS capable of a special certificate for flight-testing, 
non-experimental, they will issue an 8130-7 that is valid “for the period of time specified 
in the permit.”  When issued, an experimental certificate is good for “1 year or less after 
the date of issuance.” (Order 8130-34B, 2011, pp. 3-5) 
 
FAA Certification of Waiver or Authorization Process 
 According to the FAA, there are four ways a UAS can operate within the US:  
 
1. Restricted within an active Warning or Restricted Area,  
2. Private recreational area IAW Advisory Circular 91-57,  
3. Special Airworthiness Certificate and  
4. Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (Willis, 2010, p. 3).  
 
A Certificate of Waiver is an official document issued by the FAA that authorizes 
certain operations of aircraft to deviate from a regulation but under conditions that ensure 
an equivalent level of safety. Section 91.905 lists the sections of Part 91 that can be 
waived (8900.1, 2012, p. 3). A Certificate of Authorization (COA) is an official 
document issued by the FAA to permit certain activities that require FAA approval but 
does not waive any regulations, for example, parachuting/sky diving demonstrations 
 The process for obtaining a COA is currently being streamlined by the FAA to 
ensure safe integration of UASs into the NAS.  According to the FAA some of the 
processes to change include:  
“Establishing metrics for tracking COAs throughout the process and improving 
the on-time rate for granting an authorization, developed an automated, web-
based process to streamline steps and ensure a COA application is complete and 
ready for review, and changing the length of authorization from the current 12-
month period to 24 months” (FAA, 2012).   
 
 To obtain a COA, the requester must go online and complete an application.  The 
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application is reviewed by the FAA UAS Office which will than validate the application 
to be reviewed by Unmanned Aircraft Program Office (UAPO) who will concur or 
request revalidation.  Once the COA application is validated by UAPO it is sent back to 
the UAS for final approval, this process takes upwards of 60 days from submittal to 
approval. 
 In a 2010 presentation by Randy Willis of the FAA, data on the number of COA 
submitted from CY2008 and CY2009 and early CY2010 are reviewed.  In CY2008, 239 
COA were submitted and the number jumped to 335 in CY2009 (Willis, 2010, p. 7), this 
was a 40% increase in one year.  In 2010, there were 29 submissions as of February 22.  
The number of COAs approved were 164, 147, and 16 (Willis, 2010, p. 11) respectively. 
Data pertaining to the final numbers of COA submitted and approved for 2011 and 2012 
were not available. 
 The increase in COA submittals proves the importance for a reliable approval 
process.  So far the process is still being improved to ensure a safe transition for UASs 
into the NAS and according to the FAA “If the FAA disapproves a COA, the agency 
quickly addresses questions from the applicant and tries to provide alternative solutions 
that will lead to approval” (FAA, 2012).   
 
UAS Flight Training Requirements 
 Because a UAS may be as small as a child’s model airplane and flown by a non-
certified flight operations person, for the sake of the research conducted, the training 
requirements for a UAS pilot will be referenced from current government jobs and 
military careers seeking UAS operators.  In most cases, a certified UAS pilot requires a 
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current pilot certificate with the proper approved medical certificate.  If the pilot meets 
these criteria, then based on the specific job and duties involved, there may be specific 
minimum requirements to be met prior to being authorized to pilot a UAS.  In an online 
job posting by Avianation it stated: 
“Candidate must possess a current private pilot certificate with  
instrument rating, a minimum of 1500 hours total flight time and a  
minimum of 750 hours flying the MQ-1 and/or MQ-9. Individuals  
should also have at least two years of experience in a UAS program  
as well as previous experience as an MQ-1/9 instructor pilot.  
Weapons delivery experience is highly desired. Operational  
knowledge pertaining to UAS maintenance and PMATS scheduling is 
beneficial (UAS Pilot, 2009, p. 1).” 
 
 In the US Air Force, most pilots want to fly the aircraft from the cockpit and not 
from a computer screen hundreds of miles away from the “action.”  The surge of UAS 
into the military inventory and the high demand of UASs for the War on Terror have seen 
an increase in UAS Air Force pilots.  According to a January 2009 Air Force Times 
article, the stated, “By 2012, the Air Force plans to increase the ranks of UAV pilots and 
air operations staffers to a total of 1,100. That is up from just over 450 Predator and 
Reaper operators today - and 180 just a couple of years ago” (Air Force Times, 2009).  In 
August 2012, an article by the New American stated, “To date, there are reportedly 
around 1,300 people controlling the Air Force’s arsenal of Reaper, Predator, and Global 
Hawk drones, and the Pentagon plans to add about 2,500 pilots and support crew by 
2014” (Wolverton, 2012).  
 To increase the number of UAS pilots who meet future requirements, the Air 
Force changed the policy that UAS pilots were required to be current operational pilots.  
The new training program for UAS pilot training began in 2008; the Air Force Times 
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stated, “the Air Force will send 10 percent of its undergraduate pilots directly to UAV 
training…the first class began November 21, 2008” (Air Force Times, 2009).  To become 
an Air Force UAS pilot, a candidate must be selected for the career field from one of 
three commissioning sources, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Training 
School (OTS) or the Air Force Academy (USAFA). The candidate must take and score 
reasonably well on the Air Force Officer Qualification Test (AFOQT) pilot section, score 
well on the Basic Aptitudes Test (BAT), and receive recommendations from their 
commander.   
Once selected the candidate will attend Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) 
where they are taught the basic skills for flying and flight operations.  Since the Air Force 
has opened the selection for UAS pilots from traditional pilots to first time pilots, the 
training is changed according to Air Force Times: “Students will receive initial flight 
training at Pueblo, Colo., RPA instrument qualification, and a fundamentals course at 
Randolph AFB, Tex., and then instruction at one of the Air Force's RPA formal training 
units” (Air Force Times, 2010).  An Air Force Times article continues on to state: 
 During the 10-week course, instructors will prepare the officers to   
 fly MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers…The future RPA pilots   
 must complete about 140 hours of academics, must pass seven tests and run 
 through 36 missions on T-6 simulators, for 48 hours of training.  In   
 all, the entire RPA pilot pipeline is expected to take about a year (Tan, 2011). 
 
 Training for UAS pilots is rigorous in the US Air Force and private companies 
and government agencies are looking for UAS pilots with previous flight experience 
and/or experience flying UASs.  According to the FAA, to operate a UAS the operator of 
the UAS must be trained in the operations of the UAS and if the UAS has an 
airworthiness certificate, the operator needs to have a valid pilot certificate (FAA, 2012).  
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When the UAS is fully-opened to the NAS in 2015, the training and requirements of the 
operators should be sufficient to calm safety concerns based on operator knowledge and 
experience.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
Methodology 
 A mixed method approach was used to conduct this study.  Mixed method 
procedure is defined as the collection and analysis of qualitative and quantitative data to 
find an answer to research question(s) or hypothesis.  The purpose of this mixed methods 
study was to address the relationship between the safety concerns associated with the 
integration of the unmanned aerial system (UAS) into the National Aerospace System 
(NAS) and the safety record of the UAS.   
 A Convergent Parallel design was used to complete the study.  Convergent 
Parallel is defined as the simultaneous collection of data and separate analysis of data 
with a comparison of each result to confirm or disconfirm the information.  A good 
example of Convergent Parallel use referred to by Creswell (2014), describes a 
Convergent Parallel study conducted by Classen (2007) involving drivers 65 and older.  
Classen (2007) studied driver’s safety in older drivers “in order to develop a health 
promotion intervention based on modifiable factors influencing motor vehicle crashes 
(Creswell, 2014, p. 233).”  Using a Convergent Parallel design will help explain and 
validate any relationship between perceived safety concerns and actual safety issues.  
Figure 1 depicts the procedures to be used in the study.
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Figure 1.  Convergent Parallel Design 
 
The study consists of a qualitative approach to find the most common safety 
concerns with the integration of the UAS into the NAS.  The quantitative approach was 
conducted to find the most common causes of UAS incidents, accidents and mishaps 
within the last five years through the use of online databases.  The challenge with 
conducting this study was conducting the qualitative portion of the study on a large 
enough sample of the US population to garner significant results.  This challenge was due 
to time allotted for the study, funding and the ability to reach out to a large enough 
sample population.    
To receive expert opinions on safety, a qualitative research method consisted of 
interviews and questionnaires given to US Air Force UAS instructor and evaluator pilots 
and sensor operators.  The information gathered from the qualitative approach was 
compared to the quantitative findings to see if a relationship between the safety concerns 
and safety records exists and if the concerns are valid.   A mixed method approach to this 
study helps explain if a relationship existed between qualitative and quantitative findings. 
Most common UAS 
incidents, accidents and 
mishaps in last 5-yrs 
(QUAN) 
Compare  
Most common UAS safety 
concerns w/integration in 
the NAS 
(QUAL) 
Do the safety concerns 
relate to the safety 
record of the UAS? 
(Interpretation) 
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Quantitative Data Collection 
 This study referenced US Air Force (USAF), Navy (USN) and Army (USA) 
accident databases to complete the quantitative data collection on UAS accidents in the 
last five years and the most common causes for accidents.  The information was solicited 
via Freedom of Information Act formal requests to the Navy and Army Safety 
Institutions.  The Air Force data was compiled from the USAF Judge Advocate General 
public webpage.  The information collected from all services was not always complete 
data due to the nature of the operations in which the UAS was used.  The USN and USA 
did not provide specific dates or years, but did conform to the five year period in the 
study, while the USAF did provide that information.  The data was compiled using a 
manual tracking method to conclude if there were specific factors for the preponderance 
of accidents, and to show any significant difference in the accidents based on operator 
factors or equipment factors. 
 
Quantitative Data Analysis 
 The data collected for the quantitative study was analyzed manually.  Since the 
data was tracked manually, each accident was placed into accident class categories that 
included: USAF- Class A & Unknown; USN- Class A, B, C, H and USA- Class A, B, C, 
D, E. Within the class categories, the accidents were categorized by causal category:  
pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of controls (CT), lost link (LL) and other (O).  
Additionally, causal categories were categorized by period of flight: takeoff (TO), cruise 
(CR), landing (L) and other (O).  From the selected categories, the totals were added to 
find the most common causal for the accident and most common period of flight.  Lastly, 
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categories of impacts with structures, near midair and midair collisions were recorded by 
the researcher. 
 
Qualitative Data Collection 
Seven US Air Force instructor and evaluator UAS pilots and sensor operators 
were recruited to support the qualitative data collection. Due to Air Force regulations, the 
pilots and sensor operators could not provide support during duty hours or from 
government computers so the researcher used private emails and phone numbers to 
forward the research survey and conduct the interview.  The seven pilots and sensor 
operators that completed the survey were also asked to participate in the interview 
element of this study.   To provide a scalable measure of concerns, a list of Likert Scale 
statements were addressed in the survey.  The interviews were conducted to provide 
supporting data that could not be measured by the research survey.     
 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
The qualitative data was collected in two manners: (1) Likert scale statements, (2) 
personal interviews of each pilot and sensor operator.  The qualitative Likert scale 
statements and participant answers were created and compiled by use of an online survey 
service, Survey Monkey.  The online survey database provided the capability to analyze 
data trends of answers.  The database was able to provide support to find the mean, mode 
and median for each completed survey.  The interviews were recorded, and transcribed 
for coding using computer software.    
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Mixed Method Data Analysis 
The quantitative data was collected using several databases to find the most 
accurate and current data. The data from the quantitative study was manually compiled to 
find the most common accident causals and period of flight, in addition to impacts with 
structures, near midair collisions and midair collisions for UAS in the last five years. 
The qualitative data was collected through use of a research survey and personal 
interviews. The qualitative data was compiled manually and through the use of computer 
software coding.  Between the quantitative and qualitative data, each answer was 
provided a number code and compiled into the specific section.  For example, if one of 
the most common causes for UAS accidents was lost link it received a 1.  Regarding the 
survey, if one of the most common concerns for accidents was lost link accidents with 
another aircraft, it was given a 1.  Additionally, when interviewed, if the pilot or sensor 
operator stated that one of their concerns was lost link it was coded as 1.  The data from 
each approach was then compared to find the relationship. 
 
Procedures for Missing Data 
Due to the sensitivity of the data collected from the USAF, USN and USA, not all 
information was provided to the researcher. The researcher used the formal Freedom of 
Information Act process to garner information from each military service that uses the 
UAS on a daily basis.  Since not all the information was provided by each service and the 
accident classes were not exactly the same, the researcher compiled like data into specific 
classes, combined all the data under a five year umbrella and combined each accident 
under specific causal and period of flight categories. 
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Measurement of the Variables 
For this mixed method study, the variables used for the quantitative portion were 
categorized by accident class, accident cause and period of flight.  The variables used for 
qualitative portion of the study consisted of level of concern on a Likert Scale of 1-5.  
 
Validity Approach 
The quantitative and qualitative data were collected and tracked manually.  The 
quantitative approach consisted of data collected from accident databases to find the most 
common accidents causals and period of flight involving UAS over the last five years.   
The qualitative data was collected using a series of Likert statements and personal 
interviews with USAF instructor and evaluator UAS pilots and sensor operators and 
coded using computer software.   
 
Resources and Skills 
This research study was initiated based on the researcher’s experience with UAS 
during the War of Terror.  The researcher served 13 years in the US Air Force and 11 of 
the years as an Air Battle Manager on board the E-3 Sentry (Airborne Warning and 
Control System) aircraft conducting command and control of aircraft to include UAS 
over contingency areas.  From this experience, the researcher believed it prudent for 
research to be done based on the new regulation passage allowing integration of UAS in 
the NAS to show if concerns are legitimate based on the accident causes during flight of 
the UAS.  Additionally, the researcher conducted an internship with the Oklahoma Flight 
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Standards District Office and received in depth knowledge and experience related to 
airworthiness and certifications of pilots and aircraft.   
 
Ethical Issues 
Human participants were used during this study and approval was granted from 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Oklahoma State University prior to conducting 
the study.  Potential ethical issues discussed include personal disclosure of information 
from the USAF UAS pilots and sensor operators, perception of involuntary participation 
in the study, confidentiality issues involved with recording the interviews and legal 
differences in belief of the new regulation.   
Each issue was discussed and ways were identified to alleviate each issue.  A 
Privacy Act statement was provided for each questionnaire and prior to recording each 
interview.  A statement of voluntary involvement was provided and signed by the 
research subjects prior to their participation in the study.  Each research survey and 
personal interview included a Privacy Act statement and discussions of a legal nature 
were not associated to a pilot or sensor manager.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
Findings 
The purpose of this research was to identify, if any, relationship between the most 
common accidents types of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and the safety concerns that 
UAS pilots and sensor operators possess for the integration of the UAS into the National 
Airspace System (NAS).  This mixed method approach research project included 
quantitative data collection and analysis of the most common accidents and causes for 
accidents that occurred between June 2009 and June 2014.  Additionally, the qualitative 
data collection and analysis was conducted using US Air Force (USAF) UAS pilots and 
Sensor Operators.  The data collection included a Likert statement survey and personal 
interviews of pilots and sensor operators.    
 Between 2009 and 2014, there were 417 reported accidents by the US Air Force 
(USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Army (USA) involving UAS.  Of those accidents, the 
USAF reported 45, USA reported 324 and the USN reported 48.  Due to the sensitive 
nature of the UAS usage, not all services provided a breakdown of accidents by year, but 
provided the number of accidents and causes between the time-period requested 2009-
2014.  The USAF did break down accidents by years; these included 11 accidents in 
2009, 7 accidents in 2010, 14 accidents in 2011, 10 accidents in 2012, and 3 accidents in 
2013; 2014 numbers were not available at the time of this study.  Each military service 
accident database was categorized into classes relevant to the specific service definition 
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of accident class; Table 1 differentiates the numbers of accidents by class and service that 
were included in this study. 
 
Table 1 
 
 Accident Class Totals 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Air Force   
Class Totals  45 
A 38 
B 0 
C 0 
D 0 
Unknown 7 
Navy   
Class Totals 48  
A 8 
B 5 
C 15 
H 20 
Unknown 0 
Army   
Class Totals 324  
A 35 
B 72 
C 159 
D 57 
E 1 
 
Accident Classes 
There were 417 total UAS accidents reported in five distinct classes from 2009-
2014 between these three US military services.  Of the 417 UAS accidents included in the 
study, the stats show a disparity between accident numbers and classes between the three 
services.  For example, the USAF and USA both had 38 and 35 Class A accidents during 
this time period, while the USN reported 8, but had 20 Class H accidents; the USAF and 
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USA did not provide Class H information.  To help explain this disparity, the definitions 
of each class were included to show similarities and differences of accident types: 
In accordance with AFI91-204 (2014, pp. 21-22), an Air Force Class A Mishap resulted 
in one or more of the following:  
1. Direct mishap cost totaling $2,000,000 or more, 
 
2. A fatality or permanent total disability, 
 
3. Destruction of a DoD aircraft; Note: A destroyed Group 1, 2, or 3 RPA/UAS is 
not a Class A mishap unless the criteria in paragraphs (1) or (2) above, are met, 
and/or 
 
4. Permanent loss of primary mission capability of a space vehicle.  
 
A Class B Mishap resulted in one or more of the following:  
 
1. Direct mishap cost totaling $500,000 or more but less than $2,000,000, 
 
2. A permanent partial disability, 
 
3. Inpatient hospitalization of three or more personnel. Do not count or include 
individuals hospitalized for observation, diagnostic, or administrative purposes 
that were treated and released, and/or 
 
4. Permanent degradation of primary or secondary mission capability of a space 
vehicle or the permanent loss of secondary mission capability of a space vehicle.  
 
A Class C Mishap resulted in one or more of the following:  
 
1. Direct mishap cost totaling $50,000 or more but less than $500,000, 
 
2. Any injury or occupational illness that causes loss of one or more days away from 
work not including the day or shift it occurred. When determining if the mishap is 
a Lost Time Case, you must count the number of days the employee was unable to 
work as a result of the injury or illness, regardless of whether the person was 
scheduled to work on those days. Weekend days, holidays, vacation days, or other 
days off are included in the total number of days, if the employee would not have 
been able to work on those days, 
 
3. An occupational injury or illness resulting in permanent change of job, and/or 
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4. Permanent loss or degradation of tertiary mission capability of a space vehicle.  
 
Lastly, a Class D Mishap resulted in one or more of the following: 
  
1. Direct mishap cost totaling $20,000 or more but less than $50,000, and/or 
 
2. Any mishap resulting in a recordable injury or illness not otherwise classified as a 
Class A, B, or C mishap.  
 
In accordance with Army Regulation 385-10, Army Safety Program (2013, pp. 25-26):  
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) accidents are classified based on the   
 cost to repair or replace the UAS. A destroyed, missing, or abandoned   
 UAS will not constitute a Class A accident unless replacement or repair   
 cost is $2 million or more (AR 385-10, 2013, p. 26).  
 
An Army Class A accident occurs when: 
 
1. The resulting total cost of property damage is $2 million or more, 
 
2. An Army aircraft is destroyed, missing, or abandoned, or  
 
3. An injury and/or occupational illness results in a fatality or permanent total 
disability.  
 
An Army Class B accident occurs when: 
 
1. The resulting total cost of property damage is $500,000 or more but less than $2 
million, 
 
2. An injury and/or occupational illness results in permanent partial disability, or 
 
3. Three or more personnel are hospitalized as inpatients as the result of a single 
occurrence. 
 
An Army Class C accident occurs when: 
 
1. The resulting total cost of property damage is $50,000 or more but less than 
$500,000, 
 
2. A nonfatal injury or occupational illness that causes 1 or more days away from 
work or training beyond the day or shift on which it occurred, or 
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3. Disability at any time (that does not meet the definition of Class A or Class B and 
is a day(s)-away-from-work case). 
 
An Army Class D accident occurs when: 
 
1. The resulting total cost of property damage is $20,000 or more but less than 
$50,000, or 
 
2. A nonfatal injury or illness results in restricted work, transfer to another job, 
medical treatment greater than first aid, needle stick injuries, and cuts from sharps 
that are contaminated from another person’s blood or other potentially infectious 
material, medical removal under medical surveillance requirements of an OSHA 
standard, occupational hearing loss. 
 
Lastly, an Army Class E occurs when the resulting total cost of property damage is 
$5,000 or more but less than $20,000.  
 
In accordance with Operational Navy Instruction (OPNAV) 3750.6S (2014, pp. 14-15), A 
Navy Class A Mishap occurs when: 
1. The total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is $2 
million or more,  
 
2. A naval aircraft is destroyed or missing, or 
 
3. Any fatality or permanent total disability of personnel results from the direct 
involvement of naval aircraft or UAV.  A destroyed or missing UAV is not a class 
A unless the cost is $2 million or more.  
 
NOTE:  The Class A Mishap definition typically excludes group 1, 2 and 3 UAS and 
UAVs unless the mishap cost total is $2 million or more, or there is any fatality or 
permanent total disability of personnel.  
 
Navy Class B Mishap occurs when: 
 
1. The total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is 
$500,000 or more, but less than $2 million, or 
 
2. There is a permanent partial disability, or when three or more personnel are 
hospitalized for inpatient care (which, for mishap reporting purposes only, does 
not include just observation or diagnostic care) as a result of a single mishap.  
 
Navy Class C Mishap occurs when: 
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1. The total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is 
$50,000 or more, but less than $500,000, or 
 
2. A nonfatal injury or illness results in one or more days away from work; not 
including the day of the injury.  
 
Navy Class D Mishap occurs when: 
 
1. The total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is 
$20,000 or more, but less than $50,000, or  
 
2. There is a recordable injury (greater than first aid) or illness results not otherwise 
classified as a class A, B, or C mishap.  
 
The disparity between classes was noted due to the dollar amount for the UAS 
used by each service.  The USAF reported UAS accidents involving the MQ1B, MQ9, 
EQ4 and QRF-4C aircraft, illustrated in Figure 2 through Figure 5.  The UAS involved in 
each accident and the unit cost for each aircraft is listed in Table 2.  For example, each 
UAS is valued over the $2,000,000 amount listed in the Class A definition (AFI91-204), 
thus 38 accidents involving UAS for the USAF during the time period researched were 
Class A and the seven not listed as Class A were unknown due to the lack of information 
on cost for repair of the UAS.   
The USN reported accidents involving BQM74, K-MAX, MQ-001L, MQ-008B, 
MQ-9, RQ-1, RQ-2B, RQ-4A, RQ-7B, RQ-21B, RQ-23 and SCAN EAGLE.  The UAS 
operated by the USN and involved in this study are shown in Figure 6 through Figure 16 
and the unit cost values are listed in Table 3.  The USA reported accidents involving 
MAV, MQ-1B, MQ-1C, MQ-5B, RQ-11, RQ-11B, RQ-7, RQ-20A and RQ-12A 
(WASP3).  The UAS operated by the USA and involved in this study are shown in Figure 
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17 through Figure 21 and the unit cost values are listed in Table 4.  All figures have 
received permission for reproduction in this research study (Terms of Use, 2014).  
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 2.  US Air Force MQ1B 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 3.  US Air Force MQ9 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 4.  US Air Force EQ4 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 5.  US Air force QRF-4C 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 6.  US Navy BQM74 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 7. US Navy K-MAX 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 8. US Navy MQ1L/RQ1 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 9.  US Navy MQ8B 
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IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 10.  US Navy MQ9 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 11.  US Navy RQ2 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 12.  US Navy RQ4A 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 13.  US Navy RQ7B 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 14.  US Navy RQ21B 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 15.  US Navy RQ23 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 16.  US Navy SCAN EAGLE 
 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 17.  US Army MAV 
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IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 18.  US Army MQ1B/MQ1C 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 19.  US Army MQ5B 
 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 20.  US Army RQ11/RQ11B 
 
 
IMAGE © COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG 
Figure 21.  US Army RQ-12A (WASP3) 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
US Air Force UAS Value 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
UAS TYPE UNIT COST 
MQ1B $4.03 Million: 2010 unit cost (FY11 Presidential 
Budget, 2009) 
MQ9 $16.9 Million: 2013 cost (FY13 Presidential 
Budget, 2012) 
EQ-4 $131.4 Million: 2013 unit cost (GAO, 2013) 
QRF-4C $2.8 Million (acc.af.mil, 2011) 
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Table 3 
 
US Navy UAS Value 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
UAS TYPE UNIT COST 
BQM74 $405,000: 2015 cost (Wikipedia.com, 2015) 
K-MAX $5.0 Million: 2015 cost (Axlegeeks.com, 2015)  
MQ1L $4.03 Million: 2010 unit cost (FY11 Presidential 
Budget, 2009) 
MQ8B $10.81 Million: 2013 cost (Aeroweb, 2015) 
MQ9 $16.9 Million: 2013 cost (FY13 Presidential 
Budget, 2012) 
RQ1 $4.03 Million: 2010 unit cost (FY11 Presidential 
Budget, 2009) 
RQ2 $850,000: 2012 cost (SUASNews, 2012) 
RQ4A $131.4 Million: 2013 cost (GAO, 2013) 
RQ7B $750,000: 2011 cost (Oestergaard, 2013) 
RQ21B $9.6 Million: 2014 cost (Budget Activity, 2013) 
RQ23 Unlisted 
SCAN EAGLE $3.2 Million: 2006 cost for 4 drones & systems 
(Boeing, 2011) 
 
Table 4 
 
US Army UAS Value 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
UAS TYPE UNIT COST 
MAV (Micro Air Vehicle) Costs Vary 
MQ1B/MQ1C $4.03 Million: 2010 unit cost (FY11 Presidential 
Budget, 2009) 
MQ5B Unlisted 
RQ11/RQ11B $35,000: 2014 cost (Army-Tech, 2015) 
RQ7 $750,000: 2011 cost (Oestergaard, 2013) 
RQ20A approx. $250,000: 2014 cost (Wikipedia, 2014) 
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RQ-12A (WASP3) approx. $49,000: 2014 cost (Wikipedia, 2014) 
 
Figure 22 provides the reported UAS accidents by class from 2009-2014 timeframe. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 22.  Accident by Class 
 
Within each class each accident was further categorized by accident cause and 
period of flight.  The accident cause categories included: pilot error (PE), engine (E), loss 
of control (CT), lost link (LL) and other (O).  The period of flight categories included: 
takeoff (T/O), cruise (CR), landing (L) and other (O).   
 
Quantitative Findings 
 The following research objective guided this study:  
 Based on the most common UAS accidents causes and US Air Force UAS 
 instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor operators, is there a significant 
 relationship between safety concerns and safety issues?   
 
 The following research questions guided the quantitative research of this mixed 
method study: 
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1. What safety feature prevents UAS midair collision?  
2. How many times has this safety feature prevented midair collisions? 
3. What safety feature prevents accidents during lost link events? 
4. How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with accidents? 
5. How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without accidents? 
6. What are the most common UAS accidents within the last 5 years?  
7. Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in more accidents 
than UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements? 
 
Safety Concerns and Safety Issues Relationship 
 
 From 2009 to 2014, the three military branches observed in this research study 
reported accidents caused by pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of control (CT), lost 
link (LL) and other (O).  Figure 23 provides the most common accident causes by 
service, while Figure 24 provides the total number of accidents by cause over the five-
year period. 
 
      
     Figure 23.  Most Common Accident Causes by Service 
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Figure 24.  Most Common Accident Causes Totals 
 
Safety Concern 
Seven UAS pilots and sensor operators from the USAF completed the research 
survey.  The survey consisted of 33 Likert-scale statements relating to flight experience, 
flight safety concerns during phases of flight and safety concerns with regards to UAS 
sharing the airspace with commercial airliners.   
After collecting the data from the accident databases, this data and the responses 
to the Likert statements were compared using observations of the data.  Observation of the 
data consisted of data comparison, was conducted to discover if there were any 
relationship between safety concerns and safety accidents.  Comparison between the most 
common accidents during the three phases of flight and the level of safety concerns that 
each research subject had for accidents to occur during those phases of flight was 
completed.  UAS flight profiles were categorized into takeoff, cruise and landing and the 
most common accidents divided into the respective phase of flight.  
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Research Questions 
What safety feature prevents UAS midair collision?  
While conducting this study, the researcher identified 15 near mid-air collisions 
and two mid-air collisions from 2009-2014 reported by the USN and the USA.  The USN 
reported 15 near mid-air and zero mid-air collisions; and there were no fatalities or 
injuries in any of the cases reported, while the USA reported two mid-air collisions. The 
USAF did not report any near mid-air or mid-air collisions.   
To avoid mid-air collisions, commercial airlines use a Terrain Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS).  The TCAS uses transponder information from surrounding 
aircraft to provide the pilots information on developing safety situations.  It additionally 
uses Terrain Advisory Line (TAL) to provide pilots timely information to avoid pending 
collisions with terrain.  However; currently, UAS do not have TCAS or the capability to 
see and avoid other aircraft.  See and avoid is defined in CFR 14 91.113 as: 
  
“When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be 
maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other 
aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the 
pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it 
unless well clear.” (CFR 14 91.113, 2015). 
 
 According to the FAA (2013) document, “Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap,” “sense and avoid 
(SAA) capability must provide for self-separation and ultimately for collision avoidance 
protection between UAS and other aircraft analogous to the ‘see and avoid’ operations of 
manned aircraft that meets an acceptable level of safety,” (FAA, 2013, p. 19).  
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Additionally, the FAA continues to state that, “unmanned flight will require new or 
revised operational rules to regulate the use of SAA systems as an alternate method to 
comply with see and avoid operational rules,” (FAA, 2013, p. 19).  With this in mind, 
currently not all UAS systems have a SAA or see and avoid capability.   
 Technologically advanced UAS, such as the MQ-4 and other militarily used UAS, 
utilize cameras for the operators but these cameras are only able to see a specific amount 
of view.  To support the SAA and see and avoid concept, UAS aircraft and UAS pilots 
would have to acquire and develop a “see and avoid, radar, visual sighting, separation 
standards, proven technologies and procedures and well-defined pilot behaviors,” (FAA, 
2013, p. 19) to ensure safety of flight.  To support the SAA and see and avoid policies, 
new technology with new piloting processes and procedures need to be developed.  
Currently, Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) and Airborne Sense and Avoid 
(ABSAA) concepts and procedures are being studied and evaluated by public agencies 
and commercial companies (FAA, 2013).  These new concepts and procedures should 
help support future development of safety procedures for UAS. 
 
How many times has this safety feature prevented midair collisions? 
After gathering all possible data from the databases and the participants, the 
researcher was unable to determine the number of occurrences that the TCAS helped 
prevent flight into terrain or another aircraft.  Additionally, with the lack of sense and 
avoid capability, this data was not able to be collected. 
 
What safety feature prevents accidents during lost link events? 
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 Not all UAS have safety features for a lost link scenario; however, all UAS 
identified in this research study have a built in safety feature for lost link incidents.  Lost 
link as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is, “Loss of command and 
control link between control station and aircraft” (FAA, 2013). The safety feature is 
programmed to direct the UAS to waypoints in route to its home station if it loses link to 
its host.   
 During this study, it was determined there were 71 total lost link occurrences 
reported from the USAF, USN, and USA.  According to the FAA Roadmap (2013), “air 
traffic products, policies and procedures need to be reviewed and refined or developed 
through supporting research to permit UAS operations in the NAS,” (FAA, 2013, p. 17).  
These products, policies and procedures include operations and contingency procedures 
for UAS experiencing lost link events.  The FAA has incorporated human factors into 
their contingency plan for dealing with lost link events, categorizing lost link events 
under “Predictability and contingency management,” (FAA, 2013, p. 30) research 
challenge.  To date, the more advanced UAS, such as the MQ-4B, utilize preprogrammed 
procedures in the event of lost link.  Graph 4 provides the number of lost link incidents 
by service and class. 
46 
 
 
Figure 25.  Lost Link  
 
How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with accidents? 
As mentioned, there were 71 lost link incidents between the USAF, USA and 
USN, All 71 of the reported lost link incidents resulted in terrain or crash landings. 
 
How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without accidents? 
All 71 lost link incidents between the USAF, USA and USN ended with flight 
into terrain or crash landings; therefore, none of the UAS were reported to have landed 
safely. 
 
What are the most common UAS accidents within the last 5 years?  
 
The most common UAS accidents identified in this study were attributed to pilot 
error, engine failure, loss of control, lost link and other causes (weather, electrical, 
runway overrun, etc.).  Of these common causes, the most common accident cause was 
engine failure.  From 2009-2014, there were at total of 145 engine failure incidents that 
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resulted in a crash of a UAS.  The Army (USA) led the incident field with 120 reported 
engine failures that resulted in a Class A, B, C or D accident.  Most of the USA accidents 
resulted in a Class C incident (74), which made up 47% of all Class C USA accidents 
reported (159).  Graph 5 illustrates engine failure by military service and UAS class. 
 
Figure 26.  Engine Failure 
 
Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in more accidents than 
UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements? 
 
 All UAS accident reports identified for this research study involved military use 
UAS.  All military UAS have to meet strict airworthiness standards set by the 
Department of Defense in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 5030.61 
(2013).  For operations of UAS within the US NAS, a UAS will receive airspace access 
through issuance of Certificate of Waiver or Authorization and through receipt of a 
special airworthiness certificates, as mentioned earlier in this research.  The FAA 
Roadmap (2013) states that in the future, “COAs and special airworthiness certificates 
will transition to more routine integration processes when a new revised operating rules 
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and procedures are in place and UAS are capable of complying with them (FAA, 2013, p. 
5).”   
 The Roadmap (2013) elaborates that “to gain full access to the NAS, UAS need to 
be able to bridge the gap from existing systems requiring accommodations to future 
systems that are able to obtain a standard airworthiness certificate (FAA, 2013, p. 6).”  
This means that there needs to be a standard between all UAS operating with the NAS so 
they all meet safety standards outlined by the FAA.  Additionally, not only will the 
unmanned aircraft itself meet these “airworthiness standards,” but so will all entailed 
with the unmanned system, i.e. control station, data link and unmanned aircraft.  Ideally, 
with a safety standard in place and adhered to by all UAS receiving a standard 
airworthiness certificate, safe flight operations should increase with the number of UAS 
flying within the NAS. 
 To support meeting the certificate of waiver or authority process and to help 
mitigate the See And Avoid (SAA) issue that UAS will have, “some public agencies and 
commercial companies are seeking to develop advanced mitigations, such as Ground 
Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA); test evaluations will help develop the sensor, link, and 
algorithm requirements that could allow GBSAA to function as a partial solution set for 
meeting SAA requirement (FAA, 2013, pp. 28-29).”  With the introduction of GBSAA 
and the continued work towards Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) concepts, the 
requirement for UAS to meet certification of waiver and authority requirements should 
make UAS flight operations safer. 
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Qualitative Findings 
The following inferential research questions guided this qualitative research method of 
the mixed method study: 
1. How do current (Independent Variable ‘IV’) and proposed (IV) safety features 
integrated into a UAS prevent the most common accident (Dependent 
Variable ‘DV’) occurrences?   
 
2. Does UAS pilot training (IV) reduce the number of UAS accidents (DV)?  
 
 To support the qualitative research method of this study, a 33-question Likert-
Scale survey along with a follow up interview was conducted to support the inferential 
findings.  
 
Inferential Questions 
1.  How do current (Independent Variable ‘IV’) and proposed (IV) safety features 
integrated into a UAS prevent the most common accident (Dependent Variable ‘DV’) 
occurrences?   
 
 Since there are many different types of UAS utilized today, the inferential 
findings will utilize the RQ-1 to support the IV and DV of this section.  The RQ-1 was 
selected because it is currently in use by the USAF, US Navy, Customs and Border Patrol 
as well as other US agencies that may utilize it in the future within the NAS.  The RQ-1 
systems that support its flight operations and act as current safety features (IV) include an 
“inertial navigation system, satellite communications, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) 
transponder, primary & secondary control modules, electro-optical infrared sensor and 
synthetic aperture RADAR (SAR),” (Valdes, 2015, p. 2).  In conjunction with each other, 
these units provide some safety features for the UAS as it is more advanced than most 
commonly used UAS.  The IFF allows for flight following (IV), the satellite 
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communications allows beyond-line-of-sight control of the aircraft (IV), the optical 
cameras (IV) ensure the pilot can see in front of and to the side of the aircraft during day 
and night time operations and the SAR (IV) supports terrain mapping and “seeing 
through haze, clouds or smoke,” (Valdes, 2015, p. 3).   
 Though there is an array of equipment to support the safe operations of the UAS, 
they do not make up for a pilot actually being inside the aircraft.  The camera that are 
used for the RQ-1 is limits to their side to side movement and UAS pilots have likened 
flying the aircraft to “flying an airplane while looking through a straw,” (Valdes, 2015, p. 
6).  This sight limitation adds to the See and Avoid (SAA)/ (IV) safety issue that FAA is 
currently trying to overcome.  In addition to the SAA challenge, the RQ-1 does not carry 
a Terrain Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS)/ (IV).  Without TCAS the UAS pilot 
as well as other piloted aircraft within the NAS are unable to know they are on a collision 
heading.  During the quantitative research of this study, the US Navy reported 15 near 
midair collisions (DV), the US Army reported two midair collisions (DV) and the US Air 
Force did not report any near midair or midair collisions.       
 To support the qualitative findings of the study, the research subjects were 
interviewed and asked specific questions pertaining to safety concerns with integrating 
UAS into the NAS.  One of the questions posed to the research subjects was “based on 
your answers to the UAS safety questionnaire, describe in your professional opinion the 
top three greatest concerns you have with the integration of the UAS into the NAS?”  
Research Subject #3, the lead Evaluator Pilot for MQ-1 flight operations, stated one of 
the greatest concerns was, “the lack of TCAS (IV).”  An additional question posed to the 
research subjects was how to rectify their concerns; Research Subject #3 stated, “until the 
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equipment evolves and we have onboard sense and avoid (IV), the current processes 
utilized by the USAF (IV) are adequate to reduce risk.”   
 The results of the quantitative study within this researched yielded that the most 
common accidents occurred due to engine loss (DV) during cruise.  The resulting 
accidents were due to loss of power (DV) and ended with partial or total destruction of 
the craft.  In one case, a US Army UAS lost link during landing and struck a vehicle on 
the highway, resulting in a Class B accident.  In this case the safety features in place were 
not adequate to prevent an accident involving property on the ground; no one was injured 
during this accident. 
 
2.  Does UAS pilot training (IV) reduce the number of UAS accidents (DV)?  
 The FAA Roadmap (2013) highlights the importance of training to help increase 
safety.  The Roadmap (2013) emphasizes the importance of pilot training but also 
continues to require training for flight crewmembers, mechanics and air traffic 
controllers.  The FAA recognized that for safe operations to occur for UAS flights, it 
does not only involve the pilot but also the members that are behind the scenes such as 
sensor operators, crew chiefs and the controllers that over watch the airways.  The 
Roadmap (2013) details the training requirements for each of these members and 
explains, “UAS training standards will mirror manned aircraft training standards to the 
maximum extent possible,” (FAA, 2013, p. 28).  According to Research Subject #3, “the 
second most important issue is training (IV); there is a misconception that less training is 
required to pilot an RPA.  I can tell you from experience that is not the case due to the 
reduced situational awareness (SA) and inherent delay in the RPA operations.”  It is 
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evident that training is vital to the safe operations of the UAS. 
 The FAA Roadmap (2013) identifies pilot training as a significant requirement for 
UAS integration into the NAS.  The Roadmap states, “as new UAS evolve, more specific 
training will be developed for UAS pilots, crew members and certified flight instructors,” 
(FAA, 2013, p. 33).  The Roadmap designated a section to iterate the goals for UAS 
training requirements and provides a metrics to support: 
“UAS training standards will mirror aircraft training and standards to the maximum 
extent possible, including appropriate security and vetting requirements, and will account 
for all roles involved in UAS operation.  This may include the pilot, required crew 
members such as visual observers or launch and recovery specialists, instructors, 
inspectors, maintenance personnel, and air traffic controllers.  Accident investigation 
policies, processes, procedures and training will be developed near-term, and will be 
provided to Flight Standard District Offices (FSDO) for implementation.  Existing 
manned procedures will be leveraged as much as possible, though difference will need to 
be highlighted and resolved.” (FAA, 2013, p. 28) 
 
The FAA roadmap does not take into account the training that US military UAS pilots 
receive, and in many cases Air Force UAS pilots are previously trained manned aircraft 
pilots that have been selected for special duty as a UAS pilot.  As previously mentioned, 
USAF UAS pilots require “to complete about 140 hours of academics, must pass seven 
tests and run through 36 missions on T-6 simulators, for 48 hours of training (Tan, 
2011).”  The FAA is taking steps by including pilots, crew, maintenance, instructors, and 
FSDO to ensure the proper and adequate training for all involved with UAS flight within 
the NAS. 
 Research Subject #3 describes that one of the greatest concerns for the integration 
of the UAS in the NAS is “lack of training for most, smaller UAS operators.”  Research 
Subject #3 stated that “this is not the time to develop UAS ‘sport pilot’ equivalent 
certificate for any civilian operated quad-copter or smaller platform…but due to system 
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limitations inherent to most UAS, including reduced ability to sense and avoid, solid 
training and procedures are required to safely integrate within the NAS.”  Research 
Subject #2, a Senior Pilot and Evaluator Pilot for the MQ-9 as well as F-16 and EA-6B, 
echoes Subject #3 with regards to training.  Research Subject #2 stated that to rectify 
concerns would be to “educate the aviation community as a whole about UAS operations, 
in particular education should focus on capabilities and limitations of the RPA and about 
the training the pilot receives.”  Research Subject #2 continued to state, “the FAA/ATC 
can take many lessons on RPA incorporation with manned aircraft and operations in the 
NAS from the military.  Specifically, they can model civilian operations after the 
operations from major operating airfields and airspaces in combat areas.”  The FAA 
Roadmap (2013) seems to take this into account as they have included training for more 
than just the pilot, crew and ATC.  The Roadmap (2013) states that the UAS pilots must 
be trained as would a manned aircraft pilot, but this training may not be adequate enough 
and should go above and beyond.   
 As Research Subject #2 stated the capabilities and limitations of the UAS must be 
educated to the aviation community; Research Subject #3 stated that training is vital and 
“RPA pilots need to have a base of experience on which to relate,” Subject #3 stated that 
“when piloting an RPA, it’s impossible to ‘feel’ the sensation of the aircraft oscillating 
(during turbulence) and the pilots must rely on experience and their instruments to 
diagnose this.”  Educating and training pilots is essential in the safe operations of the 
UAS in the NAS, and training policies set by the FAA should mandate these training 
requirements that build on experience and knowledge. 
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 To guide the qualitative method of the study, the researcher utilized inferential 
research questions, which are defined by Laird Dissertation (2015) as, “techniques that 
allow us to use these samples (smaller sample of larger groups) to make generalizations 
about the populations from which the samples were drawn.”  In this study, the research 
subjects were UAS pilots and sensor operators selected from the larger group of USAF 
UAS pilots and sensor operators.     
  
Research Subject Survey 
 To gather the qualitative information required for this mixed method research 
study a 33 Likert-scale questionnaire designed to solicit the pilots’ and sensor operators’ 
knowledge of UAS was utilized.  The survey also collected information on experience 
and concern with the integration of the UAS in the NAS from the research subjects.  
Seven UAS pilots and Sensor Operators completed the survey.  The interview portion of 
the qualitative study was completed with three of the pilots that completed the research 
survey and included seven questions designed to allow the pilots to provide additional 
insight into their concerns with the integration of UAS into the NAS; the interviews were 
conducted via email due to locality limitations.  The next section of this research paper 
discusses the Likert Scale Survey utilized to gather the qualitative answers from the 
seven research subjects.  The sections will discuss the answers gathered to each of the 
questions and provide the level of concern associated with each question and section of 
the survey. 
 To establish the credibility of the research subjects involved with this study, the 
first section of the survey queried the research subjects on their “Knowledge and 
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Understanding,” with regards to UAS and manned aircraft operations and safety within 
the NAS.  The first eight statements focused on the subjects’ experience, knowledge and 
understanding of UAS, manned aircraft safety features and the NAS.  The participants 
had five possible responses with regards to knowledge and understanding: 1 – None, 2 – 
Some, 3 – Well, 4 – Very Well, and 5 – Expert. All seven participants provided responses 
with an overall knowledge and understanding mean of 4.04 (Fig 5), amounting to a “Very 
Well” per the Likert-Scale statements.  Of the seven participants, four answered level 5 
(expert) for knowledge and understanding of UAS capabilities, three answered level 5 for 
understanding operations of aircraft safety features (one answered level 2 and one 
answered level 3), two answered level 5 for knowledge of UAS safety feature 
requirements and only one was an expert for knowledge of civilian aircraft safety 
features.   
 
 
Figure 27.  Knowledge and Understanding 
 The mean for the seven members regarding understanding and knowledge of the 
NAS (Table 5) was level 4, with two members answering level 3, three participants 
Scale 
56 
 
answering level 4 and two participants answering level 5.  No participant answered level 
1 (none) for any of the first eight questions.  Though not all members were experts with 
respect to safety features for civilian and UAS aircraft and operations within the NAS, 
the overall average of level 4, indicates that each member has a very good knowledge and 
understanding of UAS operations and NAS requirements. 
 
Table 5 
 
Knowledge and Understanding of NAS 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Level of 
Concern 
Subject 
Answers 
1 0 
2 0 
3 2 
4 3 
5 2 
  
 The next 21 survey statements focused on safety and concerns related to flight 
operations in different stages of flight, accidents involving UAS during different stages of 
flight, UAS accidents due to mechanical, electrical issues and concern of UAS accidents 
based on NAS oversaturation.  For the safety portion of the survey, the Likert-Scale 
statements consisted of rankings:  1 – Not at all concerned, 2 – Slightly concerned, 3 – 
Moderately concerned, 4 – Very concerned, and 5 – Extremely concerned. The overall 
mean for this section was 1.83 (level 2, slightly concerned) and Table 6 displays the 
mean answer for each question of the safety section of the questionnaire.    
 The first three statements of the safety section of the survey focused on the 
research subjects’ concern with safety of flight within the United States and saturation of 
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the NAS.  When asked if the subject believed domestic flights are unsafe, all seven 
answered the question with a mean concern level of 2 (Slightly concerned).  When 
questioned about the current oversaturation of the NAS day to day, all seven participants 
answered with a mean concern level of 2.  The next sets of questions focused on safety 
concerns and phases of flight. 
 
Table 6 
 
Safety Concerns Questionnaire 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Safety Concern 
Section   
Question # Mean Answer 
9 2 
10 2.57 
11 2 
12 2 
13 1.86 
14 2.14 
15 1.43 
16 2.29 
17 1.71 
18 1.71 
19 1.71 
20 1.71 
21 1.71 
22 2.29 
23 1.86 
24 1.43 
25 1.57 
26 1.43 
27 1.71 
28 1.71 
29 1.5 
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 The research subjects were questioned about safety concerns with regards to 
aircraft accidents involving a UAS during three phases of flight (takeoff, cruise and 
landing), the average level of concern between the seven subjects were 1.71, or level 2.  
The participants were then questioned with regards to an UAS accident occurring during 
a lost link event, all participants responded, with a mean level of concern being 1.71.  
Two participants answered they were “Not at all concerned” (level 1) and the remaining 
five answered they were “Slightly concerned” (level 2).  The next two questions 
pertained to UAS accidents involving midair or structure collisions.  All seven 
participants answered the midair collision question, resulting in a mean level of concern 
being 2.29.  When questioned about the increase of potential accidents with terrain 
(homes, buildings, roads and populated areas), all seven participants responded that 
resulted in a mean level of concern of 1.86.  
 The final section of statements posed to the seven participants focused on safety 
concerns with regards to an increase of congestion with UAS in the NAS.  When 
questioned about an increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during takeoff, cruise and 
landing, the participants averaged concern response were 1.43, 1.71 and 1.43 respectively 
with an overall mean of 1.523 (level 2).  The research subjects were surveyed on their 
concern with regards to knowledge of UAS safety features (mean of 3.71 from 
Knowledge & Understanding) and concern for airspace safety; all seven participants 
answered providing a mean level of concern at 1.71.  Again, the participants were 
surveyed on a lost link scenario and all answers provided a mean of 1.71, no change from 
an earlier statement pertaining to lost link accidents.  The final statement in the safety 
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section of the questionnaire pertained to an increase of midair collisions when UAS are 
introduced into the NAS, the mean for this question was 1.50.   
 The phases of flight statements were posed to the research subjects on three 
different occasions, with the cruise phase being posed four times.  The phases of flight 
statements were asked with levels of concern of pertaining to accidents currently with 
commercial aircraft, with UAS aircraft, possible increase in overall accidents and finally 
with a possible increase of accidents with an UAS.  Respectively the mean of the total 
from each of these sections were 1.95, 1.71, 1.47 and 1.50. 
 The final portion of the survey related to the research subjects’ demographics.  
There was not much difference with each research subject, one participant was in his or 
her 20s, one was in his or her 40s and five were in their 30s.  Six of the participants were 
Caucasian and one was Asian.  All research subjects held a Master’s Degree and all had 
flown commercially more than 20 times in their lifetime.   
 
Mixed Method 
 
Research Objective #1: Based on the most common UAS accidents causes and US Air 
Force UAS instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor operators, is there a significant 
relationship between safety concerns and safety issues? 
 
The most common UAS accident causes discovered during the quantitative 
research involved UAS accidents experiencing some type of engine failure during flight.  
There were 145 engine event related accidents between the three military services 
researched with 95 occurring during the cruise stage of flight, this was double the amount 
of the next two common accidents, loss of controlled flight (78) and lost link incidents 
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(71).  Unfortunately in the online survey provided, there were no questions pertaining to 
engine failure and the potential for accidents with a UAS during this event.  When 
questioned about lost link events, the average level of concern between the seven pilots 
and sensor operators participating was 1.71 (level 2), “Slightly Concerned.”  When the 
three research subjects were interviewed about their greatest concerns of the UAS 
integration into the NAS, no research subject answered engine failure as a level of 
concern.  The three subjects had differing opinions of the three greatest concerns, they 
were as follows: 
Research Subject #1 
- Tremendous growth of micro UAVs and certification process required to operate them 
- Public misunderstandings of UAS capabilities  
- Public capability expectations of UAS 
Research Subject #2 
- Overall perception that UAS cannot be safely de-conflicted from manned aircraft  
- Misconception of increased airspace requirements for UAS 
- Misunderstanding of naming convention of UAS in “Lost Link” event and ATC use of 
terms--when in a lost link event, the UAS goes into “Emergency Mission Mode” and 
follows way points to designated area; this does not mean the UAS is an “Emergency 
Aircraft.” 
Research Subject #3 
- Lack of training for most, smaller UAS operators 
- For USAF Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), the lack of TCAS 
- Lack of USAF RPA divert options due to launch & recovery equipment requirements 
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From the interviews with the USAF pilots, and from the questionnaire results, there is 
only a “Slight Concern” with the integration of the UAS into the NAS.  
 
Mixed Methods 
How do interviews with US Air Force UAS pilots and sensor operators help explain any 
quantitative differences between the most common UAS accident(s), causes and the most 
common safety concerns?  
 
 The questionnaire and interviews proved very beneficial in discovering whether 
or not there were any relationship between UAS accident causes and the common safety 
concerns.  The quantitative research discovered that the most common reason for UAS 
accidents was an engine failure event, with loss of control and lost link events coming in 
second and third respectively.  With this in mind, the question posed to the pilots queried 
their three greatest concerns with the integration of the UAS into the NAS, none of the 
pilots answered that they had a safety concern with the integration of the UAS.  The 
seven pilots that completed the questionnaire were questioned about safety concerns with 
the integration of the UAS into the NAS and after collecting all the data, there was a 
mean concern level of 1.83 or a “Slight Concern.”  The questionnaire and the interview 
proved that there is minimal to no concern between seven expert UAS pilots and sensor 
operators as it relates to the most common accidents and causes and common safety 
concerns. 
 
To what extent do interviews with US Air Force UAS pilots and sensor operators help the 
overall understanding of safety concerns attributed with the integration of UAS into the 
NAS? (Content)  
  
62 
 
 The questionnaire and interviews with the pilots and sensor operators shined a 
new perspective on concerns with the integration of the UAS into the NAS.  The overall 
safety concern of the pilots and sensor operators was “Slight,” and when interviewed only 
one pilot had concern related to safety for the integration of the UAS into the NAS.  The 
concern was not directly involving UAS safety record, but dealt with the lack of training 
of small UAS operators, the lack of TCAS safety equipment for USAF RPAs, which is 
also commonly used by US government agencies within the US, and the lack of divert 
options when taking off and recovering an aircraft. 
 Instead of safety, the other two pilots discussed concerns with public perception, 
misconceptions and misunderstandings of capabilities, limitations and terminology.  The 
two pilots with these concerns discussed a misconception that an UAS cannot be safely 
de-conflicted from other aircraft without the use of increased airspace, lack of public and 
aviation community knowledge on the capabilities and limitations of an UAS and with 
the increase of micro-UAVs the lack of official policies governing and licensing of 
aircraft and pilots. 
 The interviews supported a negative relationship between the most common UAS 
accidents and causes and the most common safety concern.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
Conclusion, Recommendations, Further Research 
 
 
Summary of Research 
 This mixed method study was conducted to find a relationship between accidents 
and safety concerns related to the UAS integration into the NAS in September 2015.  The 
study included quantitative findings from information received from the US Air Force, 
Army and Navy through Freedom of Information Act Requests, and the qualitative 
findings were gathered from UAS Pilots and Sensor Operators.  Of the ten research 
subjects requested to participate in the study, seven took part in the online questionnaire, 
resulting in 70% participation, and of the seven participants, three took part in a follow-
up interview, resulting in 43% participation. 
 
Research Objective, Questions and Findings 
 The relationship between UAS accidents and concerns have been completed and 
summarized with regards to the following research objective and questions: 
Research Objective:  Based on the most common UAS accidents causes and US Air 
Force UAS instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor operators, is there a relationship 
between safety concerns and safety issues?   
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Research Questions: 
1. What safety feature prevents UAS midair collisions?  
2. How many times has this safety feature prevented midair collisions? 
3. What safety feature prevents accidents during lost link events? 
4. How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with accidents? 
5. How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without accidents? 
6. What are the most common UAS accidents within the last five years?  
7. Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in more accidents 
than UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements? 
 
To support the qualitative research method of the mixed method study, the following 
inferential questions were utilized: 
1. How do current (Independent Variable ‘IV’) and proposed (IV) safety features 
integrated into a UAS prevent the most common accident (Dependent Variable 
‘DV’) occurrences?   
 
2. Does UAS pilot training (IV) reduce the number of UAS accidents (DV)?  
 
 The research study yielded four common accident causes from safety databases of 
the US Air Force, Army and Navy.  The quantitative study found that the most common 
accidents causes for the UAS between 2009 and 2014 were pilot error, loss of control, 
lost link and engine failure.  The qualitative study was conducted to validate if the safety 
concerns were related to the safety record by utilizing a questionnaire and follow-up 
interview of Air Force UAS Pilots and Sensor Operators.  The qualitative findings 
showed that there was an overall slight safety concern (1.71 mean on a scale of 1-5, 1 
being no concern and 5 being very concerned) with regards to the integration of the UAS 
into the NAS.   
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Conclusions 
Research Objective:  Based on the most common UAS accidents causes and US Air 
Force UAS instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor operators, is there a relationship 
between safety concerns and safety issues? 
 
 Between 2009 and 2014, there were 417 reported accidents by the US Air Force 
(USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Army (USA) involving UAS.  Of those accidents, the 
USAF reported 45, USA reported 324 and the USN reported 48. Of the common causes, 
pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of control (CT), lost link (LL) and other (O), the 
most common accident cause was engine failure.  From 2009-2014, there were at total of 
145 engine failure incidents that resulted in a crash of a UAS.  The Army (USA) led the 
field with 120 reported engine failures that resulted in a Class A, B, C or D accident.  
Most of the USA accidents resulted in a Class C incident (74), which made up 47% of all 
Class C USA accidents reported (159).   
 When interviewed, the top three concerns of the UAS pilots and sensor operators 
did not relate to the number of accidents or types of accidents, as the concerns involved 
policy and perception and not accident involvement: 
- Tremendous growth of micro UAVs and certification process required to operate them 
- Public misunderstandings of UAS capabilities  
- Public capability expectations of UAS 
- Overall perception that UAS cannot be safely de-conflicted from manned aircraft  
- Misconception of increased airspace requirements for UAS 
- Misunderstanding of naming convention of UAS in “Lost Link” event and ATC use of      
  terms--when in a lost link event, the UAS goes into “Emergency Mission Mode” and  
  follows way points to designated area; this does not mean the UAS is an “Emergency 
Aircraft.” 
- Lack of training for most, smaller UAS operators 
- For USAF Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), the lack of TCAS 
- Lack of USAF RPA divert options due to launch & recovery equipment requirements 
 
 When using the Likert-Scale findings, the mixed method study showed that there 
was a positive relationship between the number of accidents during a specific phase of 
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flight (takeoff & landing), and the amount of concern of those types accidents occurring.  
It also showed a negative relationship pertaining to the highest number of incidents and 
accidents occurring during a specific phase of flight (cruise) and the low number of 
concern with accidents occurring during that phase of flight.  The calculated percentage 
of accidents during each specific phase of flight was categorized low to high: low- 0-
29%; medium- 30-50%; high- >51%.   
During the takeoff phase of flight there were a total of 84 accidents of 405 
accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase of flight not 
calculated) and amounted to 21% of the number of accidents.  The data observation 
showed that there was a positive relationship between the number of accidents and the 
level of concern (1.43), both low.   
During the cruise phase of flight there were a total of 218 accidents of 405 total 
accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase of flight not 
calculated) and amounted to 54% of the number of accidents.  The data observation 
showed that there was a negative relationship between the number of accidents and the 
level of concern, the number of accidents being highest and the level of concern slight 
(1.71).   
During the landing phase of flight there were a total of 103 accidents of 405 
accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase of flight not 
calculated) and amounted to 25% of the number of accidents.  The data observations 
showed that there was a positive relationship between the number of accidents and the 
level of concern, the number of accidents being low and the level of concern slight (1.43).   
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Midair and near midair accidents and level of concern were observed, with a 15 
near midair collisions and 2 midair collisions being reported.  Of the 405 total accidents 
that were recorded, 4% could have involved a near midair incident; near midair reports 
were not calculated in the total number of accidents observed.  Less than 1% of the 
accidents observed involved a midair collision.  When comparing these numbers to the 
mean level of concern observed from the survey, there is a positive relationship between 
the number of incidents and accidents reported and the mean of the answers provided 
from three sections questioning the level of concern related to midair incidents and 
accidents, (1.86, 2.29, 1.50).  The reported level of concern mean was 1.88, a slight 
concern, and the number of incidents and accidents were low.    
 
Research Question #1: What safety feature prevents UAS midair collisions?  
 This study identified 15 near mid-air collisions and two mid-air collisions from 
2009-2014 reported by the USN and the USA.  The USN reported 15 near mid-air and 
zero mid-air collisions; and there were no fatalities or injuries in any of the cases 
reported. The USAF did not report any near mid-air or mid-air collisions.  To avoid mid-
air collisions, commercial airlines use a Terrain Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).  
Additionally, airlines use Terrain Advisory Line (TAL) to provide pilots timely 
information to avoid pending collisions with terrain.  Currently, UAS do not have TCAS 
or the capability to see and avoid other aircraft.  The FAA states that, “unmanned flight 
will require new or revised operational rules to regulate the use of SAA systems as an 
alternate method to comply with see and avoid operational rules,” (FAA, 2013, p. 19).  
 Technologically advanced UAS, utilize cameras for the operators but these 
cameras are only able to see a specific amount of view.  To support sense or see and 
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avoid concept, UAS aircraft and UAS pilots would have to acquire and develop a “see 
and avoid, radar, visual sighting, separation standards, proven technologies and 
procedures and well-defined pilot behaviors,” (FAA, 2013, p. 19).  Currently, Ground 
Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) and Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) concepts 
and procedures are being studied and evaluated by public agencies and commercial 
companies (FAA, 2013).   
 
Research Question #2: How many times has this safety feature prevented midair 
collisions? 
 
The researcher was unable to determine the number of occurrences that the TCAS 
helped prevent flight into terrain or another aircraft.  Additionally, because UAS lack the 
sense and avoid capability, this data was not able to be collected. 
Research Question #3: What safety feature prevents accidents during lost link events? 
 
 The Lost link safety feature is programmed to direct the UAS to waypoints in 
route to its home station if it loses link to its host.  It was determined there were 71 total 
lost link occurrences reported from the USAF, USN, and USA.   
 
Research Question #4: How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with 
accidents? 
 
The study found there were 71 lost link incidents between the USAF, USA and 
USN, All 71 of the reported lost link incidents resulted in terrain or crash landings. 
 
Research Question #5: How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without 
accidents? 
 
Of the 71 lost link incidents between the USAF, USA and USN, all 71 of the 
reported lost link incidents resulted in terrain or crash landings. 
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Research Question #6: What are the most common UAS accidents within the last five 
years?  
The most common UAS accidents identified in this study were attributed to pilot 
error, engine failure, loss of control, lost link and other causes (weather, electrical, 
runway overrun, etc.).  Of these common causes, the most common accident cause was 
engine failure.  From 2009-2014, there were at total of 145 engine failure incidents that 
resulted in a crash of a UAS.   
 
Research Question #7: Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in 
more accidents than UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements? 
 
 Military UAS were studied for this research study and all military UAS meet 
strict airworthiness standards set by the Department of Defense.  For operations of UAS 
within the US NAS, a UAS will receive airspace access through issuance of Certificate of 
Waiver or Authorization and through receipt of a special airworthiness certificates. 
 The FAA Roadmap (2013) elaborates that “to gain full access to the NAS, UAS 
need to be able to bridge the gap from existing systems requiring accommodations to 
future systems that are able to obtain a standard airworthiness certificate (FAA, 2013, p. 
6).”   
 
Inferential Question #1: How do current (Independent Variable ‘IV’) and proposed (IV) 
safety features integrated into a UAS prevent the most common accident (Dependent 
Variable ‘DV’) occurrences?   
 
 The RQ-1 was identified as the UAS to study for safety features based on its 
technological capabilities.  The systems that support the RQ-1 flight operations and act as 
current safety features (IV) include an “inertial navigation system, satellite 
communications, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder, primary & secondary 
70 
 
control modules, electro-optical infrared sensor and synthetic aperture RADAR (SAR),” 
(Valdes, 2015, p. 2).  The IFF allows for flight following (IV), the satellite 
communications allows beyond-line-of-sight control of the aircraft (IV), the optical 
cameras (IV) ensure the pilot can see in front of and to the side of the aircraft during day 
and night time operations and the SAR (IV) supports terrain mapping. 
 It was found that the equipment do not make up for a pilot actually being inside 
the aircraft.  The camera utilized by the RQ-1 has viewing limits and this sight limitation 
adds to the See and Avoid (SAA)/ (IV) safety issue.  In addition, the RQ-1 does not carry 
a Terrain Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS)/ (IV).  Without TCAS the UAS pilot 
manned piloted aircraft within the NAS are unable to know they are on a collision course.  
 During the interview of the research subjects, “the lack of TCAS (IV),” was 
acknowledged as a safety concern.  
 
Inferential Question #2: Does UAS pilot training (IV) reduce the number of UAS 
accidents (DV)?  
 
 The FAA Roadmap (2013) highlights the importance of training to help increase 
safety.  The Roadmap (2013) emphasizes the importance of pilot training but also 
continues to require training for flight crewmembers, mechanics and air traffic 
controllers, “UAS training standards will mirror manned aircraft training standards to the 
maximum extent possible,” (FAA, 2013, p. 28).  Research Subject #3, “the second most 
important issue is training (IV); there is a misconception that less training is required to 
pilot an RPA.  I can tell you from experience that is not the case due to the reduced 
situational awareness (SA) and inherent delay in the RPA operations.”   
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 Research Subject #3 describes that one of the greatest concerns for the integration 
of the UAS in the NAS is “lack of training for most, smaller UAS operators.”  Research 
Subject #3 stated that “this is not the time to develop UAS ‘sport pilot’ equivalent 
certificate for any civilian operated quad-copter or smaller platform…but due to system 
limitations inherent to most UAS, including reduced ability to sense and avoid, solid 
training and procedures are required to safely integrate within the NAS.”  Research 
Subject #2 stated that to rectify concerns would be to “educate the aviation community as 
a whole about UAS operations, in particular education should focus on capabilities and 
limitations of the RPA and about the training the pilot receives.”  Research Subject #2 
continued to state, “the FAA/ATC can take many lessons on RPA incorporation with 
manned aircraft and operations in the NAS from the military.  Specifically, they can 
model civilian operations after the operations from major operating airfields and 
airspaces in combat areas.”  Research Subject #2 and #3 acknowledged that educating 
and training pilots is essential in the safe operations of the UAS in the NAS, and training 
policies set by the FAA should mandate these training requirements that build on 
experience and knowledge. 
  
Recommendation 
Recommendation #1 
 The FAA has crafted FAA Roadmap 2013 and implemented the UAS Integration 
Office to support the integration and operations of UAS.  The FAA should continue to 
refine the Roadmap (2013) as the integration process begins and update policy and 
regulations as required.  The UAS Integration Office should provide UAS operators a 
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way to provide feedback and lessons learned to make the process, procedures and 
operations of the UAS safer and efficient.  Additionally, the FAA should research ways 
to deal with and implement contingency plans for unintentional and deliberate accidents 
involving UAS and further legislation must budget for the increased requirements.     
 
Recommendation #2 
 The FAA Roadmap 2013 stresses the importance of training pilots, crews, 
maintenance and air traffic controllers on UAS operations and this should continue and 
evolve as the integration progresses.  The training provided should be monitored and 
reviewed by Flight Standard District Office (FSDO) Inspectors and held to the same 
standards as manned aircraft and pilots.  The FAA must create and uphold a standards 
and evaluations system that mirrors manned flight operations but is also unique to UAS 
flight operations.  FSDO Inspectors should provide inputs into the success and failures of 
such a system as they gather information from field inspections.  
 
Recommendation #3 
 The public perception of the UAS is garnered from what is seen on the news and 
this may skew the views on operations and safety of the UAS.  The public may not have a 
good understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the UAS as well as the 
background and concept of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act 2012.  Research 
Subject #1 and #2 stated that their concerns included, “public misunderstandings of UAS 
capabilities, public capability expectations of UAS, overall perception that UAS cannot 
be safely de-conflicted from manned aircraft and misconception of increased airspace 
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requirements for UAS.”  The UAS Integration Office should research and implement a 
public service campaign to inform the public of UAS operations, the concept of the 
Reform Act and way forward for the safe integration of the UAS into NAS.  This 
campaign’s focus should aim to inform the public of UAS operations and change a 
negative perception of UAS use and safety issues.  The UAS Integration Office must 
implement a way to track safety issues, such as accidents, near mid-air and mid-air 
collisions as well as any research done on UAS operations and provide public 
accessibility to this database for review. 
 
Recommendation for Further Research 
 Due to the small sample size utilized for this research study, further research must 
be accomplished to ensure that all avenues of the safe integration of the UAS into the 
NAS have been covered.  For this research study only US Air Force UAS Pilots and 
Sensor Operators were utilized for as research subjects.  Of the requested ten research 
subjects only seven UAS Pilots and Sensor Operators were utilized to complete the 
questionnaire, and of those only three conducted a follow-up interview.  Future research 
conducted should include a sample size conducive to the general public and non-military 
UAS pilots.   
 The FAA should take steps to implement databases that track UAS operations and 
safety issues with regard to the UAS operations within the NAS.  This database should be 
utilized for comparison and analysis for future research projects, as outlined in the FAA 
Roadmap 2013, and findings should drive regulation and legislative updates.  Future 
research should include and be directed towards the current regulations and legislation 
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and discover if the status quo is sufficient for the safe integration of the UAS into the 
NAS, and if not, why and what needs to change to ensure the safe operations of the UAS 
in the NAS.
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LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING: 
 
Knowledge: Familiarity with system to include facts, information, or skills 
 
Understanding: Knowledge sufficient to support intelligent behavior with respect to an objects 
abilities and disposition  
_________________________ 
1 2   3    4 5  
None Some        Well   Very        Expert  
1 – None   
2 – Some   
3 – Well  
4 – Very Well  
5 – Expert 
 
On a scale of 1 - 5, please rate your knowledge of: 
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) capabilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Civilian aircraft safety features requirements?  
1 2 3 4 5 
UAS aircraft safety features requirements?  
1 2 3 4 5 
Understanding operations of aircraft safety features?  
1 2 3 4 5 
Different UAS missions? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Understanding of the different UAS missions? 
1 2 3 4 5 
The National Airspace System (NAS)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Understanding of the NAS requirements for flight operations? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
SAFETY: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
1  2     3             4            5  
Not Concerned Slightly Concerned    Moderately Concerned   Very Concerned     Extremely Concerned 
1 – Not at all concerned 
2 – Slightly concerned 
3 – Moderately concerned  
4 – Very concerned 
5 – Extremely concerned  
On a scale of 1 - 5 with regards to standard manned flight, please rate your level of concern 
as it pertains to:  
Belief that flying within the domestic United States is not safe? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Domestic airliner’s safety record when you are flying in a commercial airliner? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Oversaturation of the NAS with airplanes day to day? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mid air collisions when you fly? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Runway incursions when you fly? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being involved in an aircraft accident during takeoff? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being involved in an aircraft accident at cruise altitude? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being involved in an aircraft accident during landing? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Based on an increase of UAS in the NAS, on a level of 1 - 5 how concerned are you: 
Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during takeoff? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during cruise? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during landing? 
1 2 3 4 5 
If you knew that a UAS had less safety equipment than commercial airliners, how concerned 
would you be for airspace safety? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Based on your understanding and knowledge of UASs, how concerned are you that an accident 
would occur if a UAS lost its data connection to the operator? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How concerned are you that UAS in the national airspace system would cause more mid air 
collisions? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How concerned are you that the UAS in the national airspace system would increase the potential 
of accidents with terrain (i.e. homes, buildings, roads, populated areas)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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There will be an increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during takeoff? 
1 2 3 4 5 
There will be increases in aircraft accidents with a UAS during cruise? 
1 2 3 4 5 
An increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during landing? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Based on your knowledge of UASs safety features, how concerned would you be for airspace 
safety? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Based on your knowledge of UASs, how concerned are you that an accident would occur if a 
UAS lost its data connection to the operator? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How concerned are you that UAS in the national airspace system would cause more mid air 
collisions? 
1 2 3 4 5 
How concerned are you that the UAS in the national airspace system would increase the potential 
of accidents with terrain (i.e. homes, buildings, roads, populated areas)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS: 
Age: 20-29     30-39     40-49     50-54 
Race: Caucasian     African American     Hispanic     Asian     Other 
Education (level completed): High School   Associate  Bachelor  Masters  Doctorate 
Number of commercial flights (approximate): None  1-9  10-19  20+ 
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Briefly describe your aviation experience to include training, flight hours, pilot or aircrew 
experience. 
Briefly describe your experience and knowledge of unmanned aerial systems to include any 
piloting or sensor operator experience or any research you’ve accomplished. 
Briefly describe your duties in the current position you hold to include training, years of 
experience and daily duties. 
Describe your experience conducting safety inspections, mishap investigations and/or accident 
investigations. 
Based on your answers to the unmanned aerial system (UAS) safety questionnaire, describe in 
your professional opinion the top three greatest concerns you have with the integration of the 
UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS). 
Based on your answers to your greatest concerns of the UAS integration into the NAS, what 
needs to be done to rectify those top three concerns? 
In your overall assessment, do you feel the integration of the UAS into the NAS is a major safety 
concern or do you feel that with the current direction of the integration there will be minimal 
impact to safety? 
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Year LOC CLASS MODEL EVENT_SHORT_NARR 
2009 W A MQ1B Electrical failure of primary control module (PCM) 
2009 U A MQ1B Engine failure due to improper oil sys temp valve assembly 
2009 W   MQ1B Electrical failure-lost link crash 
2009 U A MQ1B 
Loss of manifold absolute pressure (MAP) on takeoff, loss of 
engine power; vacuum line disconnect 
2009 W A MQ1B Loss of controlled flight due to dislodged software chip 
2009 W   MQ1B Lost link 
2009 W A MQ1B Quill shaft failure due to manufacturer improper tempering 
2009 W A MQ1B Mechanical failure of variable pitch propeller (VPP) servo 
2009 W   MQ1B Loss of servo control & subsequent lost link 
2009 W A MQ1B Electrical failure, lost link & emergency procedure inability 
2009 W A MQ1B Controlled flight into terrain mountain; pilot error 
2010 W A MQ1B Oil leak leading to engine failure 
2010 U   MQ9 Unknown 
2010 W A MQ1B Pilot error during T/O 
2010 U   MQ1B Pilot error during taxi 
2010 U A MQ1B Pilot error during touch and go 
2010 W   MQ1B Unknown 
2010 W A MQ1B Pilot error during stall recovery 
2011 W A EQ4 Electrical power interruption to aerilon/spoiler controls 
2011 W A MQ1B Quill shaft failure 
2011 W A MQ1B Lost link - no wreckage found 
2011 W A MQ1B Lost link - flew into weather 
2011 W A MQ1B Lost link - lightning strike 
2011 W A MQ1B Pilot error - Impact w/ground during landing  
2011 U A QRF-4C Electrical power disruption & pilot error 
2011 W A MQ1B Loss of electrical power to aileron  
2011 W A MQ1B Engine failure; Pilot error during recovery (hit fence) 
2011 W A MQ1B Prop thrust bearing failure (engine) 
2011 W   MQ1B Runway overrun (hit fence) 
2011 W A MQ1B Engine failure due to loss of oil 
2011 W A MQ1B Lost link 
2011 N A MQ9A Pilot error - Forced landing; uncommanded engine shutdown 
2012 W A MQ1B Lost link 
2012 W A MQ1B Lost link 
2012 W A MQ1B Crew error - crash during T/O, uncommanded roll 
2012 W A MQ1B Engine failure 
2012 N A MQ9A Pilot error - fuel flow shut off 
2012 W A MQ1B Engine failure - Hard ditch 
2012 W A MQ1B Forced landing - engine coolant leak 
2012 W A MQ1B Dual alternator failure - damage to farmhouse & crops 
93 
 
2012 W A MQ1B VPP failure - checklist discipline (pilot error) 
2012 U A MQ9A Pilot error  
2013 W A MQ1B Lack of thrust  & increased wind during T/O 
2013 U A MQ1B VPP failure  
2013 W A MQ1B Memory chip failure leading to uncommanded movements 
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EVENT_SEVTY_C ACFT_MODEL EVENT_SHORT_NARR 
A MQ008B MQ-8 failed to acquire automated recovery system, ran out of fuel 
and impacted water 
A MQ008B MQ-8 made an uncommanded Navigator mode change out of 
normal mode of operation resulting in a crash 
A RQ004A UAV Class A Flight Mishap with ruddervator malfunction. No injuries 
or fatalities.   
A MQ008B Loss of MQ-8B during recovery 
A K-MAX Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (CRUAS/K-MAX) flight 
mishap.   
A MQ008B MQ-8B experienced a hard landing from a hover just after takeoff 
A BQM74 BQM-74E Target impacted US Navy Ship during Combat Systems 
Ship Qualification Trials. 
A MQ008B MQ-8B crashed at sea. 
B RQ007B RQ-7B SHADOW EXPERIENCED ENGINE CUT ON TAKEOFF AND 
IMPACTED GROUND. 
B RQ007B Shadow UAV lost link and impacted the ground  
B MQ008B MQ-8B Fire Scout sustained damage in flight. 
B RQ021A RQ-21: During test flight for new recovery zone, contractor-operated 
RQ-21 crashed on short final 
B RQ021A UAS engine failed to cut off on recovery and A/C swung into 
recovery hook. 
C SCANEAGL SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF UAV LOST POWER AND IMPACTED WATER.               
C RQ007B UAV INTENTIONALLY DEPLOYED PARACHUTE AFTER BEING UNABLE 
TO LAND. NO INJ 
C RQ007B ACFT LANDED ON RNWY EDGE AND COLLIDED WITH SHADOW 
ARRESTING GEAR EQPT  
C RQ007B SHADOW UAV IMPACTED GROUND SHORT OF RUNWAY DUE TO 
ENGINE PROBLEMS.     
C RQ007B UNMANNED ACFT ENG SHUT DOWN IN FLIGHT, NO INJURIES. ACFT 
WAS RECOVERED 
C RQ007B UNMANNED ACFT ENG SHUT DOWN IN FLIGHT. NO INJURIES. ACFT 
WAS RECOVERED 
C RQ007B UAV impacted ground under a deployed parachute after 
experiencing an engine failure on a FAM flight. 
C RQ007B (b)(5)  RQ-7B Propulsion System Failure 
C RQ007B UAV LAUNCHED, FLEW PAST FIELD BOUNDARIES TO AN ALTITUDE OF 
250' AGL, ENGINE STOPPED, CRASHED. 
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C RQ007B RQ-7B ENGINE FAILED DURING RECONNAISSANCE MISSION. 
AIRCRAFT LANDED UNDER RECOVERY PARACHUTE. 
C RQ007B RQ-7B engine failure after departure from LZ   (b)(5) 
C MQ008B MQ-8B hot start during ground turn. 
C SCANEAGL ScanEagle CFIT 
C RQ007B An IE RQ-7B Shadow experienced engine failure resulting in FTS 
deploy. 
C SCANEAGL ScanEagle departure from controlled flight during recovery phase. 
H MQ009 Due to lost link, MQ-9 strayed outside of restricted operating area    
H MQ009 During handover training aircraft engine was inadvertently secured     
H MQ009 INFLIGHT GENERATOR FAILURE                                             
H RQ002B UNINTENTIONAL ENGINE CUT DURING FINAL APPROACH                         
H RQ007B RQ-7B SHADOW UAV EXPERIENCED A LEFT ELERUDDER SERVO 
FAILURE            
H RQ007B RQ-7B Shadow UAV hard landing                                          
H SCANEAGL SCAN EAGLE UAV ENGINE FAILURE LEADS TO EMERGENCY LANDING               
H RQ007B Upon normal  UAV Tactical Automated Landing System recovery one 
of the arresting gear straps broke  
H RQ007B ACE II Box Warm Boot immediately after launch causes near mishap. 
H RQ001 ***Three near mid-air events with UAV's in 2 week span. 
H SCANEAGL ***Scan Eagle taking off from 05L crossed 100' in front of AH-1W on 
GCA final to 23L. 
H RQ007B RQ-7B was cleared to RTB with procedural control while another 
UAV was in its path coaltitude 
H RQ007B RQ-7B RPA was descending to intercept final and experienced engine 
stoppage due to fuel starvation 
H RQ007B RQ-7B in landing phase experienced fuel starvation and deployed 
parachute 
H RQ021A RQ-21A GPS signal failure results in STUAS emergency landing 
H RQ007B RQ-7B landed, caught arresting gear, gear snapped, Air Vehicle 
experienced net arrestment. 
H MQ001L ***Near Mid-Air Collision with RPA on IFR Departure 
H RQ007B RQ-7B experienced engine emergency and decided to RTB. Engine 
failed close to base and crashed 
H RQ007B RQ-7B experienced sudden engine failure in flight with no indication.  
Deployed parachute. 
H RQ007B RQ-7B experienced engine failure in flight during OEF mission.  AV 
was recovered. 
H RQ021A RQ-21A (STUAS) crashed during recovery at Twenty-Nine Palms 
H MQ001L ***P-3 Near mid-air collision during tactical event 
H MQ001L ***P-3 Uncommanded climb of UAV causes potential near mid-air. 
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H SCANEAGL Scan Eagle experiences airspeed sensor failure resulting in a water 
landing.  
H RQ004A ***A BAMS-D RQ-4A was struck by a Bird while within the Class D 
airspace of NAS Patuxent River (KNHK). 
H RQ004A RQ-4A aileron actuator malfunction during descent for arrival. 
H MQ009 ***P-3 Near Mid-Air Collision During Operational Mission 
H RQ007B An RQ-7B Shadow was damaged during recovery. 
H UNKNOWN ***NEAR MID-AIR WITH UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT 
H RQ007B An RQ-7B had a TFOA incident on a routine training flight in the R-
2301W airspace. 
H UNKNOWN ***AIRCRAFT NEAR MID-AIR COLLISION WITH A REMOTELY PILOTED 
AIRCRAFT 
H RQ23A RQ-23A TigerShark Block IIIA UAV stalled shortly after take-off 
H UNKNOWN ***Air Traffic Controller authorized a UAV to taxi onto a runway 
occupied by a vehicle 
H RQ004A ***RQ-4: Navy RQ-4A and Air Force RQ-4B Near Mid Air Collision  
H UNKNOWN ***NEAR MID-AIR COLLISION 
H MQ009 ***Crew Experiences two near mid-air events with RPAs  
H MQ009 ***Bird strike to a NASA Ikhana UAV at PMRF Barking Sands. 
 
***Numbers did not count towards accident numbers (17 incidents) 
***Near midair incidents counted separately  
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Crash Type CLASS MODEL EVENT_SHORT_NARR 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed A MQ-5B Fuel Starvation 
Spin/Stall A MQ-5B Contractor Aircraft Accident 
Engine Failure A MQ-5B Contractor Aircraft Accident 
Contractor Aircraft Accident A MQ-1C Avionics 
Spin/Stall A MQ-5B Contractor Aircraft Accident 
  A MQ-1B Collision With Ground/Water 
Collision With Ground/Water A MQ-5B Contractor Aircraft Accident 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed A 
YMQ-
18A Fuel Starvation 
  A MQ-1B Collision With Ground/Water 
  A MQ-5B Collision With Ground/Water 
  A MQ-5B Other Collision 
  A MQ-5B Collision With Ground/Water 
Avionics A MQ-5B Contractor Aircraft Accident 
Uncommand Control Input A MQ-1C Contractor Aircraft Accident 
Other Collision A RQ-7B Multiple Aircraft Event 
Other Collision A MQ-1B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  A MQ-5B Other Collision 
Other Collision A MQ-1B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Other Collision A MQ-1C Power Train 
  A MQ-1C Other Collision 
Other Collision A MQ-1C Landing Gear Collapse/Retraction 
Undershoot A MQ-1C Engine Failure 
Engine Failure A MQ-1C Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Other Collision A MQ-1C Engine Failure 
Other Collision A MQ-5B Engine Failure 
  A MQ-5B Other Collision 
  A MQ-1C   
  A MQ-1B Other Collision 
Collision With Ground/Water A MQ-1C Engine Failure 
  A MQ-1C Other Collision 
  A MQ-5B Collision With Ground/Water 
  A MQ-1C Other Collision 
  A MQ-1C Collision With Ground/Water 
  A MQ-1B Collision With Ground/Water 
  A MQ-1B Engine Failure 
Collision With Ground/Water A MQ-1C Uncommand Control Input 
Collision With Ground/Water B RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Engine Failure B RQ-7B Electrical System 
Electrical System B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Collision With Ground/Water B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
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  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
  B RQ-7B Electrical System 
  B RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
Tree Strike B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Drive Train B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Aborted Takeoff B MQ-5B Contractor Aircraft Accident 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Fuel Starvation B RQ-7B Electrical System 
Engine Failure B RQ-7A Fts Parachute Failure 
  B RQ-7B Electrical System 
Ground Loop/Swerve B MQ-5B Aborted Takeoff 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Contractor Aircraft Accident 
Power Train B RQ-7B Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed 
Electrical System B RQ-7B Missing Aircraft/UAS 
Electrical System B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Engine Failure B RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Missing Aircraft/UAS B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  B RQ-7B Object Strike 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
  B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  B RQ-7B Other Collision 
Object Strike B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Collision With Ground/Water B RQ-7B Fuel Starvation 
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Uncommand Control Input B RQ-7B Engine Over torque/Overload 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Flight Control 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed B RQ-7B Flight Control 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed B RQ-7B Avionics 
Collision With Ground/Water B RQ-7B Electrical System 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Overshoot/Overrun B RQ-7B Hard Landing 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed B RQ-7B Fuel System 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Electrical System 
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed B RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed B RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Object Strike B RQ-7B 
Tactical Automated Landing System 
(TALS) 
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
IMC Related B RQ-7B Flight Control 
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Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  B RQ-7B Other Collision 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Uncommand Control Input 
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Other Collision B RQ-7B Electrical System 
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Aircraft Collision On The Ground B MQ-1C Multiple Aircraft Event 
  B RQ-7B Missing Aircraft/UAS 
  B MQ-1C Fuel Exhaustion 
  B RQ-7B Other Collision 
  B RQ-7B Other Collision 
  B RQ-7B Other Collision 
  B RQ-7B   
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
  B RQ-7B   
  B RQ-7B Other Collision 
  B RQ-7B Missing Aircraft/UAS 
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
  B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
  B MQ-5B   
Engine Failure B RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
  B RQ-7B   
  B RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  B RQ-7B   
  C RQ-11B Collision With Ground/Water 
  C MAV Collision With Ground/Water 
Engine Failure C RQ-7B Electrical System 
Collision With Ground/Water C RQ-11B Avionics 
  C RQ-7B Object Strike 
Collision With Ground/Water C RQ-7B FTS Parachute Failure 
Flight Control C RQ-11B Collision With Ground/Water 
  C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Engine Failure C RQ-7B Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed 
Avionics C RQ-11B Missing Aircraft/UAS 
  C RQ-11B Collision With Ground/Water 
  C RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
  C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C MAV Electrical System 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  C RQ-7B Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed 
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Engine Over speed/Overtemp C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Engine Over speed/Overtemp C MQ-5B Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed 
Engine Failure C MQ-5B Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Missing Aircraft/UAS C 
RQ-
11A Collision With Ground/Water 
Undershoot C RQ-7B Electrical System 
  C RQ-7B   
  C RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Flight Control 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C RQ-7B Electrical System 
  C RQ-7B Electrical System 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Collision With Ground/Water C RQ-7B Airframe 
  C RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Engine Failure C RQ-7B Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed 
Collision With Ground/Water C RQ-7B Launcher Malfunction 
Object Strike C MQ-1C   
  C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Tree Strike C RQ-7B Flight Control 
  C RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Collision With Ground/Water C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Fuel Starvation 
Collision With Ground/Water C MAV Fuel Exhaustion 
Collision With Ground/Water C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C RQ-7B Electrical System 
  C RQ-7B Other Collision 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Undershoot 
Other Collision C MAV Engine Failure 
  C RQ-7B Fire And/or Explosion On The Ground 
  C RQ-7B   
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Other Collision C MQ-5B Overshoot/Overrun 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Uncommand Control Input 
  C MQ-1C Other Collision 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  C MAV Collision With Ground/Water 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Fuel Starvation 
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Other Collision C RQ-7B Uncommand Control Input 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B 
Tactical Automated Landing System 
(TALS) 
Engine Failure C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  C PUMA Other Collision 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS Fts Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Uncommand Control Input 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Engine Failure C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Electrical System 
Hard Landing C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C MAV Other Collision 
Electrical System C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  C RQ-7B Object Strike 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Landing Gear Collapse/Retraction 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  C RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Undershoot C RQ-7B Hard Landing 
  C PUMA Collision With Ground/Water 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
Engine Failure C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  C RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Mast Bumping C MAV Missing Aircraft/UAS 
  C PUMA Other Collision 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Flight Control 
  C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Flight Control 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  C PUMA Missing Aircraft/UAS 
Mid-Air Collision C PUMA Multiple Aircraft Event 
  C PUMA Other Collision 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
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Ditching C MQ-5B Contractor Aircraft Accident 
  C RQ-7B FTS Parachute Failure 
  C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C RQ-7B Other Collision 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C SFOZ Contractor Aircraft Accident 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C MQ-5B Undershoot 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Engine Failure C RQ-7B Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Wheels Up Landing C RQ-7B Collision With Ground/Water 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed C RQ-7B Fuel Starvation 
  C MQ-5B Overshoot/Overrun 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed 
  C PUMA Other Collision 
  C RQ-7B Other Collision 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Electrical System 
  C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Engine Failure C RQ-7B Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
  C MQ-5B Other Collision 
  C MQ-5B Other Collision 
  C MQ-5B Other Collision 
  C PUMA Object Strike 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Electrical System 
  C RQ-7B Parachute Deployment 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C PUMA Other Collision 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C PUMA Uncommand Control Input 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Airframe 
  C RQ-7B Airframe 
Other Collision C PUMA Engine Over speed/Overtemp 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Transmission Failure 
Other Collision C PUMA Uncommand Control Input 
  C PUMA Other Collision 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  C PUMA Collision With Ground/Water 
  C MQ-1C Hard Landing 
  C     
  C RQ-11B   
  C RQ-7B   
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  C RQ-7B   
  C MQ-1C Collision With Ground/Water 
  C MQ-1C   
Collision With Ground/Water C RQ-7B Uncommand Control Input 
Collision With Ground/Water C RQ-7B Uncommand Control Input 
  C RQ-7B Other Collision 
Other Collision C RQ-7B Uncommand Control Input 
  C RQ-7B 
Automatic Take Off/Landing System 
(ATLS) 
  C RQ-7B Other Collision 
  C RQ-7B Other Collision 
  C RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  D RQ-11B Other Collision 
  D RQ-11B Other Collision 
Overshoot/Overrun D RQ-7B 
Tactical Automated Landing System 
(TALS) 
Missing Aircraft/UAS D RQ-11B Collision With Ground/Water 
Arresting Gear Failure (Drum, Strap, 
Pendant) D RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
  D RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
  D RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Missing Aircraft/UAS D RQ-11B Avionics 
  D RQ-7B Object Strike 
  D RQ-11B Antenna Strike 
Arresting Gear Failure (Drum, Strap, 
Pendant) D RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
Missing Aircraft/UAS D RQ-11B Uncommand Control Input 
  D RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
Overshoot/Overrun D RQ-7B 
Tactical Automated Landing System 
(TALS) 
  D RQ-11B Other Collision 
  D MQ-5B Object Strike 
Collision With Ground/Water D RQ-11B Avionics 
Hard Landing D RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
  D MQ-5B Airframe 
  D MQ-5B Landing Gear/Arresting Hook 
Missing Aircraft/UAS D RQ-11B Collision With Ground/Water 
  D MQ-1C Landing Gear/Arresting Hook 
Collision With Ground/Water D RQ-11B Avionics 
Collision With Ground/Water D RQ-11B Avionics 
Collision With Ground/Water D RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Missing Aircraft/UAS D RQ-11 Collision With Ground/Water 
  D RQ-7B Other Collision 
  D RQ-7B Object Strike 
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  D RQ-11B Collision With Ground/Water 
Hard Landing D RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Other Collision D RQ-7B Engine Failure 
  D RQ-11B Collision With Ground/Water 
  D MQ-1B Engine Failure 
  D RQ-11 Collision With Ground/Water 
Fuel Starvation D MQ-5B Electrical System 
  D WASP3 Other Collision 
  D RQ-11B Other Collision 
Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed D RQ-7B Engine Failure 
Missing Aircraft/UAS D RQ-11 
Tactical Automated Landing System 
(TALS) 
Other Collision D RQ-7B Power Train 
  D RQ-11B Other Collision 
  D RQ-11B Missing Aircraft/UAS 
  D MAV Other Collision 
Other Collision D RQ-7B Landing Gear/Arresting Hook 
  D RQ-7B Other Collision 
  D RQ-11B Missing Aircraft/UAS 
Engine Failure D RQ-7B Engine Over torque/Overload 
Other Collision D RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
Engine Failure D RQ-7B Engine Over torque/Overload 
Other Collision D RQ-7B Undershoot 
  D RQ-11B Other Collision 
  D RQ-11B Other Collision 
  D RQ-11B Other Collision 
Other Collision D RQ-11 Flight Control 
Other Collision D RQ-11 Engine Failure 
Ditching D RQ20A Wheels Up Landing 
Other Collision D RQ-7B Overshoot/Overrun 
Hard Landing E RQ-7B Forced Landing/UAS FTS Employed 
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Terms of Use 
 
This is a human-readable summary of the Terms of Use. 
Disclaimer: This summary is not a part of the Terms of Use and is not a legal document. It is simply a handy 
reference for understanding the full terms. Think of it as the user-friendly interface to the legal language of our 
Terms of Use. 
Part of our mission is to:  
• Empower and Engage people around the world to collect and develop 
educational content and either publish it under a free license or dedicate it to the 
public domain. 
• Disseminate this content effectively and globally, free of charge. 
You are free to:  
• Read and Print our articles and other media free of charge. 
• Share and Reuse our articles and other media under free and open licenses. 
• Contribute To and Edit our various sites or Projects. 
Under the following conditions:  
• Responsibility – You take responsibility for your edits (since we only host your 
content). 
• Civility – You support a civil environment and do not harass other users. 
• Lawful Behavior – You do not violate copyright or other laws. 
• No Harm – You do not harm our technology infrastructure. 
• Terms of Use and Policies – You adhere to the below Terms of Use and to the 
applicable community policies when you visit our sites or participate in our 
communities. 
With the understanding that:  
• You License Freely Your Contributions – you generally must license your 
contributions and edits to our sites or Projects under a free and open license 
(unless your contribution is in the public domain). 
• No Professional Advice – the content of articles and other projects is for 
informational purposes only and does not constitute professional advice. 
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